How to Regulate Carbon Emissions with Climate-conscious Consumers

F. Herweg, Klaus M. Schmidt
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引用次数: 8

Abstract

Carbon prices are the most cost-effective instrument to reduce CO2 emissions, but there is strong political opposition to raising them to the efficient level. Therefore, additional efforts of consumers, firms, and local governments are required. We study how different regulatory regimes affect moral behaviour and show that a carbon tax complements voluntary efforts to reduce emissions, while cap-and-trade discourages them. The opportunity to invest in offsets increases welfare, while the option to buy and delete emission rights induces more emissions and reduces welfare. Furthermore, cap-and-trade shifts the burden of adjustment to poor consumers and has dysfunctional incentive effects.
如何与有气候意识的消费者一起监管碳排放
碳价格是减少二氧化碳排放的最具成本效益的工具,但将其提高到有效水平存在强烈的政治反对。因此,需要消费者、企业和地方政府的进一步努力。我们研究了不同的监管制度是如何影响道德行为的,并表明碳税是对自愿减排努力的补充,而“总量管制与交易”则阻碍了自愿减排努力。投资碳补偿的机会增加了福利,而购买和删除排放权的选择则导致了更多的排放,并减少了福利。此外,总量管制与交易将调整的负担转移给了贫穷的消费者,并产生了功能失调的激励效应。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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