Adversarial risk analysis for first-price sealed-bid auctions

Pub Date : 2021-06-01 DOI:10.1111/anzs.12315
Muhammad Ejaz, Chaitanya Joshi, Stephen Joe
{"title":"Adversarial risk analysis for first-price sealed-bid auctions","authors":"Muhammad Ejaz,&nbsp;Chaitanya Joshi,&nbsp;Stephen Joe","doi":"10.1111/anzs.12315","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div>\n \n <p>Adversarial risk analysis (ARA) is an upcoming methodology that is considered to have advantages over the traditional decision-theoretic and game-theoretic approaches. ARA solutions for first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auctions have been found but only under strong assumptions which make the model somewhat unrealistic. In this paper, we use ARA methodology to model FPSB auctions using more realistic assumptions. We define a new utility function that considers bidders’ wealth, we assume a reserve price and find solutions not only for risk-neutral but also for risk-averse as well as risk-seeking bidders. We model the problem using ARA for non-strategic play and level-<i>k</i> thinking solution concepts.</p>\n </div>","PeriodicalId":0,"journal":{"name":"","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/anzs.12315","citationCount":"5","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"","FirstCategoryId":"100","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/anzs.12315","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5

Abstract

Adversarial risk analysis (ARA) is an upcoming methodology that is considered to have advantages over the traditional decision-theoretic and game-theoretic approaches. ARA solutions for first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auctions have been found but only under strong assumptions which make the model somewhat unrealistic. In this paper, we use ARA methodology to model FPSB auctions using more realistic assumptions. We define a new utility function that considers bidders’ wealth, we assume a reserve price and find solutions not only for risk-neutral but also for risk-averse as well as risk-seeking bidders. We model the problem using ARA for non-strategic play and level-k thinking solution concepts.

分享
查看原文
首价密封拍卖的对抗风险分析
对抗风险分析(ARA)是一种新兴的方法,被认为比传统的决策理论和博弈论方法具有优势。已经找到了首价密封投标(FPSB)拍卖的ARA解决方案,但仅在强有力的假设下,这使得该模型有些不现实。在本文中,我们使用ARA方法使用更现实的假设来模拟FPSB拍卖。我们定义了一个考虑投标人财富的新效用函数,我们假设了一个保留价格,并找到了解决方案,不仅适用于风险中性的投标人,也适用于风险厌恶者和风险寻求者。我们使用ARA对非战略性玩法和k级思维解决方案概念进行建模。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信