RASCv2: Enabling Remote Access to Side-Channels for Mission Critical and IoT Systems

Yunkai Bai, Andrew Stern, Jungmin Park, M. Tehranipoor, Domenic Forte
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

The Internet of Things (IoT) and smart devices are currently being deployed in systems such as autonomous vehicles and medical monitoring devices. The introduction of IoT devices into these systems enables network connectivity for data transfer, cloud support, and more, but can also lead to malware injection. Since many IoT devices operate in remote environments, it is also difficult to protect them from physical tampering. Conventional protection approaches rely on software. However, these can be circumvented by the moving target nature of malware or through hardware attacks. Alternatively, insertion of the internal monitoring circuits into IoT chips requires a design trade-off, balancing the requirements of the monitoring circuit and the main circuit. A very promising approach to detecting anomalous behavior in the IoT and other embedded systems is side-channel analysis. To date, however, this can be performed only before deployment due to the cost and size of side-channel setups (e.g., and oscilloscopes, probes) or by internal performance counters. Here, we introduce an external monitoring printed circuit board (PCB) named RASC to provide remote access to side-channels. RASC reduces the complete side-channel analysis system into two small PCBs (2 \( \times \) 2 cm), providing the ability to monitor power and electromagnetic (EM) traces of the target device. Additionally, RASC can transmit data and/or alerts of anomalous activities detected to a remote host through Bluetooth. To demonstrate RASCs capabilities, we extract keys from encryption modules such as AES implemented on Arduino and FPGA boards. To illustrate RASC’s defensive capabilities, we also use it to perform malware detection. RASC’s success in power analysis is comparable to an oscilloscope/probe setup but is lightweight and two orders of magnitude cheaper.
RASCv2:支持关键任务和物联网系统的侧信道远程访问
物联网(IoT)和智能设备目前正在自动驾驶汽车和医疗监控设备等系统中部署。将物联网设备引入这些系统,可以实现数据传输、云支持等方面的网络连接,但也可能导致恶意软件注入。由于许多物联网设备在远程环境中运行,因此也很难保护它们免受物理篡改。传统的保护方法依赖于软件。然而,这些可以通过恶意软件的移动目标特性或通过硬件攻击来绕过。或者,将内部监控电路插入物联网芯片需要进行设计权衡,平衡监控电路和主电路的要求。在物联网和其他嵌入式系统中检测异常行为的一种非常有前途的方法是侧信道分析。然而,到目前为止,由于侧通道设置(例如示波器、探头)的成本和尺寸,只能在部署之前执行此操作,或者通过内部性能计数器执行。在这里,我们介绍了一种外部监测印刷电路板(PCB),称为RASC,提供对侧信道的远程访问。RASC将完整的侧信道分析系统缩小为两个小pcb (2 \( \times \) 2 cm),提供监控目标器件的功率和电磁(EM)走线的能力。此外,RASC可以通过蓝牙将检测到的异常活动的数据和/或警报传输到远程主机。为了演示rasc的功能,我们从Arduino和FPGA板上实现的AES等加密模块中提取密钥。为了说明RASC的防御能力,我们还使用它来执行恶意软件检测。RASC在功率分析方面的成功可与示波器/探头设置相媲美,但重量轻,价格便宜两个数量级。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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