A Ratiocinative Appraisal of Harvey Siegel’s Critique of Epistemological Relativism

IF 0.1 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Joseph T. Ekong
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Abstract

Methodology: This work is expository, analytic, critical and evaluative in its methodology. Admittedly, there are a number of debates that are relevant to questions concerning objectivity in science. One of the oldest, and still one of the most intensely fought, is the debate over epistemic relativism. Epistemic relativism is the position that knowledge is valid only relatively to a specific context, society, culture or individual. The discussion about epistemic relativism is one of the most fundamental discussions in epistemology concerning our understanding of notions such as 'justification' and 'good reason'. All forms of epistemic relativism commit themselves to the view that it is impossible to show in a neutral, non-question-begging, way that one “epistemic system,” that is, one interconnected set of epistemic standards, is epistemically superior to others. Purpose: In one sense, this work, in defense of Harvey Siegel, takes issue with anti-realist views that eschew objectivity. But, in another sense, it interrogates the epistemic absolutism of Harvey Siegel, showing some of its untoward implications for the furtherance of knowledge, as typified in most ambitious versions of foundationalist or dogmatic epistemology. Minimally, objectivity maintains that an objective gap between what is the case and what we take to be the case, exists. Plato was very clear in his claim that epistemological relativism was self-defeating in two ways. As reformulated by Siegel: First, arguments for relativism are either relativistically or non-relativistically sound. Second, relativism is either relativistically or non-relativistically true. Either choice commits the relativist to major concessions to his or her opponent. In each case, they are dialectically ineffective for the relativist. Results: One cannot live reasonably as a relativist, because relativism leads to epistemic paralysis. Relativism is rationally indefensible, because it is incoherent. It is incoherent because it can be true only if it is false. Relativism has been, in its various guises, both one of the most popular and most reviled philosophical doctrines of our time. Defenders see it as a harbinger of tolerance and the only ethical and epistemic stance worthy of the open-minded and tolerant. Detractors dismiss it for its alleged incoherence and uncritical intellectual permissiveness. Unique Contribution to theory, practice and policy: In the midst of different proponents of critical thinking, Harvey Siegel stands out in his attempt to address fundamental epistemological issues. He argues that discursive inclusion of diverse groups should not be confused with rational justification of the outcome of inquiry, and maintains that inclusion, as an epistemic virtue, is neither necessary nor sufficient for rational judgment, and that in order not to become victims of relativism, certain criteria are needed to distinguish what is indeed rational. Insofar as relativism might be construed, by some scholars, as a gadfly (a gadfly is a person who interferes with the status quo of a society or community by posing novel, potentially upsetting questions, usually directed at authorities) against any form of dogmatism, in philosophy, the basic presuppositions of relativism are self-referentially inconsistent.
西格尔对认识论相对主义批判的理性评价
方法论:这项工作是解释性的,分析性的,批判性的和评估性的。不可否认,有许多争论是与科学客观性有关的问题。其中一个最古老的,也是争论最激烈的,是关于认知相对主义的争论。认识论相对主义认为知识只有相对于特定的背景、社会、文化或个人才是有效的。关于认识论相对主义的讨论是认识论中最基本的讨论之一,涉及我们对“证明”和“良好理由”等概念的理解。所有形式的认识论相对主义都认为,不可能以一种中立的、非问问题的方式表明,一个“认识论系统”,即一套相互关联的认识论标准,在认识论上优于其他系统。目的:从某种意义上说,为哈维·西格尔辩护,这部作品对回避客观性的反现实主义观点提出了质疑。但是,在另一种意义上,它质疑哈维·西格尔的认识论绝对主义,显示了它对知识的推进的一些不利影响,正如最雄心勃勃的基础主义或教条主义认识论的典型版本。最起码,客观性坚持在实际情况和我们认为的情况之间存在客观差距。柏拉图很清楚地指出,认识论相对主义在两个方面是弄巧成拙的。正如西格尔重新表述的那样:首先,相对主义的论点要么是相对的,要么是非相对的。第二,相对主义要么是相对的,要么是非相对的。无论选择哪一种,相对主义者都要对他或她的对手做出重大让步。在每一种情况下,它们对相对主义者来说都是辩证无效的。结果:一个人不能以相对主义者的身份合理地生活,因为相对主义会导致认知麻痹。相对主义在理性上是站不住脚的,因为它不连贯。它是不连贯的,因为只有当它是假的,它才能是真的。相对主义以各种各样的形式,既是我们这个时代最流行的哲学教义之一,也是最受诟病的哲学教义之一。辩护者认为它是宽容的先兆,是唯一值得开放和宽容的道德和认知立场。批评者因其所谓的不连贯和不加批判的知识放任而对其不屑一顾。对理论、实践和政策的独特贡献:在批判思维的不同支持者中,哈维·西格尔在解决基本认识论问题的尝试中脱颖而出。他认为,对不同群体的话语包容不应与对调查结果的理性论证相混淆,并坚持认为,作为一种认知美德,包容对于理性判断既不是必要的,也不是充分的,为了不成为相对主义的受害者,需要某些标准来区分什么是真正的理性。在某种程度上,相对主义可能被一些学者解释为反对任何形式的教条主义的牛虻(牛虻是指通过提出新颖的、潜在的令人不安的问题来干扰社会或社区现状的人,通常是针对当局的),在哲学中,相对主义的基本前提是自我参照不一致的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
50.00%
发文量
41
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