Incentive Aware Computation Resource Sharing and Partition in Pervasive Mobile Cloud

IF 3.7 3区 计算机科学 Q2 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Jigang Wen, Yuxiang Chen, Chuda Liu
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Abstract

Cloud computing is a promising technique to conquer the resource limitations of a single mobile device. To relieve the work load of mobile users, computation-intensive tasks are proposed to be offloaded to the remote cloud or local cloudlet. However, these solutions also face some challenges. It is difficult to support data intensive and delay-sensitive applications in the remote cloud, while the local cloudlets often have limited coverage. When both of these methods cannot be supported, another option is to relieve the load of a single device by taking advantage of resources of surrounding smart-phones or other wireless devices. To facilitate the efficient operation of the third option, we propose a novel pervasive mobile cloud framework to provide an incentive mechanism to motivate mobile users to contribute their sources for others to borrow and an efficient mechanism to enable multi-site computation partition. More specifically, we formulate the problem as a Stackelberg game, and prove that there exists a unique Nash Equilibrium for the game. Based on the unique Nash Equilibrium, we propose an offloading protocol to derive the mobile users’ strategies. Through extensive simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate the theoretical properties of the proposed economy-based incentive mechanism.
普适移动云中具有激励意识的计算资源共享与划分
云计算是一种很有前途的技术,可以克服单个移动设备的资源限制。为了减轻移动用户的工作负担,建议将计算密集型任务卸载到远程云或本地云上。然而,这些解决方案也面临着一些挑战。很难在远程云中支持数据密集型和对延迟敏感的应用程序,而本地云的覆盖范围通常有限。当这两种方法都不支持时,另一种选择是通过利用周围智能手机或其他无线设备的资源来减轻单个设备的负载。为了促进第三种选择的高效运行,我们提出了一种新的普惠移动云框架,提供一种激励机制来激励移动用户贡献自己的资源供他人借用,并提供一种有效的机制来实现多站点计算分区。更具体地说,我们将问题表述为Stackelberg博弈,并证明存在唯一的纳什均衡。基于唯一纳什均衡,我们提出了一种卸载协议来推导移动用户的策略。通过大量的模拟,我们评估了基于经济的激励机制的绩效并验证了其理论性质。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Journal of Cloud Computing-Advances Systems and Applications
Journal of Cloud Computing-Advances Systems and Applications Computer Science-Computer Networks and Communications
CiteScore
6.80
自引率
7.50%
发文量
76
审稿时长
75 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Cloud Computing: Advances, Systems and Applications (JoCCASA) will publish research articles on all aspects of Cloud Computing. Principally, articles will address topics that are core to Cloud Computing, focusing on the Cloud applications, the Cloud systems, and the advances that will lead to the Clouds of the future. Comprehensive review and survey articles that offer up new insights, and lay the foundations for further exploratory and experimental work, are also relevant.
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