Truthful Liars: How They and Other Oddities are Possible

IF 0.2 4区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY Pub Date : 2021-10-12 DOI:10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.2.05

Giovanni Tuzet

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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Abstract:Some philosophers claim that truth is the norm of assertion, or that asserting that p commits one to the truth of p. In some seminal works Peirce put it in terms of responsibility: asserting that p makes one responsible for the truth of the proposition that p. I take this thesis to be stimulating but inaccurate, since making an assertion generally commits one to sincerity, not to truth. This explains how it is possible to be truthful liars and why we are disappointed by these. Justification of belief is also important, as shown by the cases of the justified falsity-teller and the unjustified truth-teller. So, for the assessment of assertion, what matters is (a) what we believe, (b) whether we assert what we believe and (c) whether we have a justification for what we believe. This does not throw truth out of the picture, however: insofar as asserting that p is asserting that one believes that p, and believing that p is believing that it is true that p, asserting that p is asserting that one believes that it is true that p. The paper also distinguishes some senses in which truth is normative for belief and assertion, and endorses a teleological understanding of this.

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诚实的说谎者:他们和其他古怪的人是如何可能的

摘要:一些哲学家声称真理是断言的规范，或者断言p使人对p的真理负有责任。在一些开创性的著作中，皮尔斯用责任来表述:断言p使人对p命题的真理负有责任。我认为这个论点令人兴奋，但不准确，因为断言通常使人对真诚负责，而不是对真理负责。这就解释了为什么诚实的说谎者是可能的，以及为什么我们会对此感到失望。信念的正当化也很重要，正如被正当化的说假话者和未被正当化的说真话者的例子所表明的那样。所以，对于断言的评估，重要的是(a)我们相信什么，(b)我们是否断言我们所相信的，以及(c)我们是否有理由证明我们所相信的。然而，这并没有抛弃真理:只要断言p就是断言一个人相信p，而相信p就是相信p是真的，断言p就是断言一个人相信p是真的。本文还区分了一些意义，在这些意义上真理是信仰和断言的规范，并赞同目的论的理解。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

0.70

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society has been the premier peer-reviewed journal specializing in the history of American philosophy since its founding in 1965. Although named for the founder of American pragmatism, American philosophers of all schools and periods, from the colonial to the recent past, are extensively discussed. TCSPS regularly includes essays, and every significant book published in the field is discussed in a review essay. A subscription to the journal includes membership in the Charles S. Peirce Society, which was founded in 1946 by Frederic H. Young. The purpose of the Society is to encourage study of and communication about the work of Peirce and its ongoing influence in the many fields of intellectual endeavor to which he contributed.