{"title":"1. Truth ascriptions, falsity ascriptions, and the paratactic analysis of indirect discourse","authors":"S. Tsohatzidis","doi":"10.1515/9783110687538-001","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The present paper considers certain obviously valid types of inferences involving indirect speech reports, and argues that their validity is incompatible with Davidson’s so-called “paratactic” analysis of the logical form of such reports (Davidson 1969). It further claims that this particular failure of the Davidsonian analysis has a special significance for Davidson’s overall project of using what he terms a “Tarski-style” truth theory as a theory of natural language meaning (Davidson 1967): that project assumes that grasp of the concepts of truth and falsity is essential to natural language interpretation, yet Davidson’s analysis cannot characterize as valid certain natural language inferences whose recognition as valid is arguably constitutive of one’s grasp of the concepts of truth and falsity.","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"54 1","pages":"527-534"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Logique et Analyse","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110687538-001","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The present paper considers certain obviously valid types of inferences involving indirect speech reports, and argues that their validity is incompatible with Davidson’s so-called “paratactic” analysis of the logical form of such reports (Davidson 1969). It further claims that this particular failure of the Davidsonian analysis has a special significance for Davidson’s overall project of using what he terms a “Tarski-style” truth theory as a theory of natural language meaning (Davidson 1967): that project assumes that grasp of the concepts of truth and falsity is essential to natural language interpretation, yet Davidson’s analysis cannot characterize as valid certain natural language inferences whose recognition as valid is arguably constitutive of one’s grasp of the concepts of truth and falsity.
期刊介绍:
Logique et Analyse is the continuation of Bulletin Intérieur, which was published from 1954 on by the Belgian National Centre for Logical Investigation, and intended originally only as an internal publication of results for its members and collaborators. Since the start of the new series, in 1958, however, the journal has been open to external submissions (and subscriptions). Logique et Analyse itself subscribes to no particular logical or philosophical doctrine, and so is open to articles from all points of view, provided only that they concern the designated subject matter of the journal.