Reasons and Beliefs

IF 0.5 4区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

Journal of Philosophical Research Pub Date : 2019-08-09 DOI:10.5840/JPR201988137

Attila Tanyi, Matteo Morganti

引用次数: 0

Abstract

The present paper identifies a challenge for a certain view of practical reasons, according to which practical reasons (both normative and motivating) are states of affairs. The problem is that those who endorse such a view seem forced to maintain both (a) that the contents of beliefs are states of affairs and (b) that the conception according to which the contents of beliefs are states of affairs is outlandish. The suggestion is put forward that, by distinguishing the content of a belief (as a proposition) from its object (as a state of affairs), the conflict between (a) and (b) can be neutralized.

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理由与信念

本文确定了对实践原因的某些观点的挑战，根据实践原因(规范性和激励性)是事务状态。问题是，那些支持这种观点的人似乎被迫坚持(a)信仰的内容是事态，(b)根据信仰的内容是事态的概念是古怪的。有人认为，只要把一个信念的内容(作为命题)和它的对象(作为事件的状态)区别开来，就可以消除(a)和(b)的矛盾。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Philosophical Research PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

0.70

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Philosophical Research is an annual peer-reviewed journal uniquely committed to the advancement of all areas of philosophical inquiry. It publishes articles from any philosophical orientation, in English or French, that make a significant contribution to the field. A generous length limit provides an outlet for essential works such as bibliographies, translations, and commentaries that are difficult to publish because of unusual length or complex format. JPR is particularly interested in helping new authors and an outstanding group of referees provides written comments on submitted manuscripts.