{"title":"On the Mandatory Stay of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy","authors":"Kenneth M. Ayotte","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3060748","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Subsidiary legal entities can be used to create a path around bankruptcy's automatic stay, giving a secured creditor a free right to withdraw collateral. In some cases, core assets of the firm are made separable from each other. To fully understand the desirability of subsidiaries as a path around the stay, I take a step backward and ask a fundamental question that has not been addressed formally: why do we need a mandatory stay of secured creditors in the first place? The model generates conditions under which a stay of secured creditors can be valuable. Three conditions are necessary: a) the collateral must be firm-specific, b) debt contracts are sequential and incomplete, and c) bargaining at bankruptcy is imperfect. Under these conditions, a debtor may grant withdrawal rights even when they are less efficient than a stay. I discuss ways that a stay might be made applicable to subsidiary creditors in a way that is targeted at the inefficiencies the model identifies.","PeriodicalId":44862,"journal":{"name":"American Bankruptcy Law Journal","volume":"131 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2017-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"American Bankruptcy Law Journal","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3060748","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
Subsidiary legal entities can be used to create a path around bankruptcy's automatic stay, giving a secured creditor a free right to withdraw collateral. In some cases, core assets of the firm are made separable from each other. To fully understand the desirability of subsidiaries as a path around the stay, I take a step backward and ask a fundamental question that has not been addressed formally: why do we need a mandatory stay of secured creditors in the first place? The model generates conditions under which a stay of secured creditors can be valuable. Three conditions are necessary: a) the collateral must be firm-specific, b) debt contracts are sequential and incomplete, and c) bargaining at bankruptcy is imperfect. Under these conditions, a debtor may grant withdrawal rights even when they are less efficient than a stay. I discuss ways that a stay might be made applicable to subsidiary creditors in a way that is targeted at the inefficiencies the model identifies.