A Non-puzzle about Assertion and Truth

Q2 Arts and Humanities

Logos and Episteme Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI:10.5840/logos-episteme202011435

John Turri

引用次数: 1

Abstract

It was recently argued that non-factive accounts of assertoric norms gain an advantage from “a puzzle about assertion and truth.” In this paper, I show that this is a puzzle in name only. The puzzle is based on allegedly inconsistent linguistic data that are not actually inconsistent. The demonstration’s key points are that something can be (a) improper yet permissible, and (b) reproachable yet un-reproached. Assertion still has a factive norm.

查看原文本刊更多论文

关于断言和真理的非谜题

最近有人认为，对断言规范的非事实性描述从“关于断言和真理的困惑”中获得了优势。在本文中，我证明这只是一个名义上的谜题。这个谜题是基于据称不一致的语言数据，实际上并不一致。该论证的要点是，某件事可以是(a)不恰当的，但也是允许的;(b)可责备的，但又不应责备的。断言仍然有一个有效规范。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

Logos and Episteme Arts and Humanities-Philosophy

CiteScore

0.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

20 weeks

期刊介绍： the journal publishes articles, reviews or discussion notes focused as well on problems concerning the general theory of knowledge, as on problems specific to the philosophy, methodology and ethics of science, philosophical logic, metaphilosophy, moral epistemology, epistemology of art, epistemology of religion, social or political epistemology, epistemology of communication. Studies in the history of science and of the philosophy of knowledge, or studies in the sociology of knowledge, cognitive psychology, and cognitive science are also welcome.