Belief Inhibition during Thinking: Not So Fast

Abstract

The present study is a conceptual replication of a study by De Neys and Franssens (2009) about the role of belief inhibition in reasoning, operationalized as the change in reaction times to different categories of words presented after syllogistic reasoning task. As in the original study, we examined the accessibility of cued beliefs after syllogistic reasoning, by presenting participants ( N = 145) with incongruent (heuristic and normatively correct answers differ) and congruent categorical syllogisms, and lexical decision tasks comprising cued and unrelated words, and imposed methodological restrictions within the original pro - cedure. Mean RT was overall shorter to cued than to unrelated words, and for all combinations of both syllogism congruency and response accuracy on the preceding syllogism, indicating that the full neglect of content is not necessary for correct evaluation of logical status. We registered shorter RTs for words cued by incongruent syllogisms after correct than after incorrect evaluation, which indicates that participants actively process the content of the syllogism while reasoning, as a form of cognitive control. The success - fully conducted Type 2 reasoning enhances lexical access to the cued content, rather than impairing it. In short, findings of the original study were replicated for the priming effects, but not for the inhibition of content.