{"title":"DISCLOSURE DECISION IN AN ENTRY GAME WITH COSTLY INFORMATION INTERPRETATION","authors":"Eda Orhun","doi":"10.1142/S2194565919500052","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes a firm’s incentives to disclose private information related to its market situation when there is a potential competitor. However, I adopt a more realistic definition of transparency that has been mostly overlooked by the earlier literature. In a realistic situation, financial transparency does not imply that all the relevant information are automatically transmitted to the receiver of the signal but instead the available information needs to be understood. When the model is adjusted to incorporate this realistic definition of transparency, fully revealing equilibrium associated with the “Revelation Principle” does not exist anymore. It is observed that the model with interpretation costs of transparency yields both pooling and partially pooling equilibria.","PeriodicalId":44015,"journal":{"name":"Global Economy Journal","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Global Economy Journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S2194565919500052","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
This paper analyzes a firm’s incentives to disclose private information related to its market situation when there is a potential competitor. However, I adopt a more realistic definition of transparency that has been mostly overlooked by the earlier literature. In a realistic situation, financial transparency does not imply that all the relevant information are automatically transmitted to the receiver of the signal but instead the available information needs to be understood. When the model is adjusted to incorporate this realistic definition of transparency, fully revealing equilibrium associated with the “Revelation Principle” does not exist anymore. It is observed that the model with interpretation costs of transparency yields both pooling and partially pooling equilibria.
期刊介绍:
The GEJ seeks to publish original and innovative research, as well as novel analysis, relating to the global economy. While its main emphasis is economic, the GEJ is a multi-disciplinary journal. The GEJ''s contents mirror the diverse interests and approaches of scholars involved with the international dimensions of business, economics, finance, history, law, marketing, management, political science, and related areas. The GEJ also welcomes scholarly contributions from officials with government agencies, international agencies, and non-governmental organizations. One over-arching theme that unites IT&FA members and gives focus to this journal is the complex globalization process, involving flows of goods and services, money, people, and information.