DISCLOSURE DECISION IN AN ENTRY GAME WITH COSTLY INFORMATION INTERPRETATION

IF 1 Q3 ECONOMICS
Eda Orhun
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

This paper analyzes a firm’s incentives to disclose private information related to its market situation when there is a potential competitor. However, I adopt a more realistic definition of transparency that has been mostly overlooked by the earlier literature. In a realistic situation, financial transparency does not imply that all the relevant information are automatically transmitted to the receiver of the signal but instead the available information needs to be understood. When the model is adjusted to incorporate this realistic definition of transparency, fully revealing equilibrium associated with the “Revelation Principle” does not exist anymore. It is observed that the model with interpretation costs of transparency yields both pooling and partially pooling equilibria.
具有昂贵信息解释的进入博弈中的披露决策
本文分析了当存在潜在竞争对手时,企业披露与其市场状况相关的私人信息的动机。然而,我采用了一个更现实的透明度定义,这在很大程度上被早期的文献所忽视。在现实情况下,财务透明度并不意味着所有相关信息都自动传递给信号的接收方,而是需要了解现有的信息。当这个模型被调整到包含这个透明度的现实定义时,与“启示原则”相关的充分揭示的平衡就不再存在了。我们观察到,具有透明度解释成本的模型同时产生池化和部分池化均衡。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
14.30%
发文量
4
期刊介绍: The GEJ seeks to publish original and innovative research, as well as novel analysis, relating to the global economy. While its main emphasis is economic, the GEJ is a multi-disciplinary journal. The GEJ''s contents mirror the diverse interests and approaches of scholars involved with the international dimensions of business, economics, finance, history, law, marketing, management, political science, and related areas. The GEJ also welcomes scholarly contributions from officials with government agencies, international agencies, and non-governmental organizations. One over-arching theme that unites IT&FA members and gives focus to this journal is the complex globalization process, involving flows of goods and services, money, people, and information.
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