Plato’s Theodicy in the Timaeus

Abstract

Abstract The aim of this paper is to challenge the claims that Plato’s theodicy, if existent at all, is meager and undeveloped. In it I focus on the Timaeus alone, and after briefly examining the question why would an omnibenevolent God create a sensible world at all, try to extract three theodicean strategies from the dialogue. The first one is known as the Principle of Plenitude, and it professes to explain the abundance of life forms in the universe, some of which seem superfluous or unwanted. In the course of presenting this strategy, I also try to show that it can justifiably be ascribed to Plato, against Sarah Broadie’s criticism. The second strategy is the Solution from Personal Responsibility, and it mainly aims at addressing the moral aspect of the problem of evil. The third and the last one I call the Coeval Entity Solution, and it discloses the Timaean Necessity as a cause of natural evils. I try to argue, against David Sedley, that Necessity is indeed of stubborn or recalcitrant nature.