Securing Memory Encryption and Authentication Against Side-Channel Attacks Using Unprotected Primitives

Thomas Unterluggauer, M. Werner, S. Mangard
{"title":"Securing Memory Encryption and Authentication Against Side-Channel Attacks Using Unprotected Primitives","authors":"Thomas Unterluggauer, M. Werner, S. Mangard","doi":"10.1145/3052973.3052985","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Memory encryption is used in many devices to protect memory content from attackers with physical access to a device. However, many current memory encryption schemes can be broken using Differential Power Analysis (DPA). In this work, we present MEAS---the first Memory Encryption and Authentication Scheme providing security against DPA attacks. The scheme combines ideas from fresh re-keying and authentication trees by storing encryption keys in a tree structure to thwart first-order DPA without the need for DPA-protected cryptographic primitives. Therefore, the design strictly limits the use of every key to encrypt at most two different plaintext values. MEAS prevents higher-order DPA without changes to the cipher implementation by using masking of the plaintext values. MEAS is applicable to all kinds of memory, e.g., NVM and RAM, and has memory overhead comparable to existing memory authentication techniques without DPA protection, e.g., 7.3% for a block size fitting standard disk sectors.","PeriodicalId":20540,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3052973.3052985","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3

Abstract

Memory encryption is used in many devices to protect memory content from attackers with physical access to a device. However, many current memory encryption schemes can be broken using Differential Power Analysis (DPA). In this work, we present MEAS---the first Memory Encryption and Authentication Scheme providing security against DPA attacks. The scheme combines ideas from fresh re-keying and authentication trees by storing encryption keys in a tree structure to thwart first-order DPA without the need for DPA-protected cryptographic primitives. Therefore, the design strictly limits the use of every key to encrypt at most two different plaintext values. MEAS prevents higher-order DPA without changes to the cipher implementation by using masking of the plaintext values. MEAS is applicable to all kinds of memory, e.g., NVM and RAM, and has memory overhead comparable to existing memory authentication techniques without DPA protection, e.g., 7.3% for a block size fitting standard disk sectors.
使用未受保护的原语保护内存加密和身份验证免受侧信道攻击
许多设备都使用内存加密来保护内存内容,防止攻击者对设备进行物理访问。然而,许多当前的内存加密方案可以使用差分功率分析(DPA)来破解。在这项工作中,我们提出了MEAS——第一个内存加密和身份验证方案,提供针对DPA攻击的安全性。该方案通过将加密密钥存储在树结构中来阻止一阶DPA,而不需要DPA保护的加密原语,从而结合了新密钥和身份验证树的思想。因此,该设计严格限制每个密钥的使用,最多只能加密两个不同的明文值。MEAS通过使用明文值的屏蔽来防止高阶DPA,而无需更改密码实现。MEAS适用于所有类型的内存,例如NVM和RAM,其内存开销与没有DPA保护的现有内存认证技术相当,例如,适合标准磁盘扇区的块大小为7.3%。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信