FROM A WILLING GOOD COP TO A RELUCTANT BAD COP: THE (D)EVOLUTION OF UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA

IF 1.4 Q2 SOCIAL SCIENCES, INTERDISCIPLINARY
Heesu Lee, Sunil Kim
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This study posits that the ineffective and futile efforts of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to contain North Korean nuclear ambition are a result of the United States (U.S.) consistently and strategically developing its sanctions regimes, rather than the limited implementation of the UNSC’s measures or by the non-compliance of China and Russia, the two North Korean-leaning permanent UNSC members. The U.S/ has endeavoured to maximise its strategic leverage against North Korea by consolidating bilateral channels to increase its foreign policy capacity and flexibility, instead of reinforcing multilateral pressures through the UNSC. Although both the U.S. and the UNSC share the goal of nuclear non-proliferation in Northeast Asia, the former deliberately exploited the deficient decision making process of the latter to maximise its foreign policy flexibility. Consequently, the U.S. has flexibly pursued both engagement and containment of North Korea while maintaining its hard-line stance against it at the UNSC, whereas the UNSC’s sanctions on North Korea have gradually become rigid and inflexible, without achieving tangible outcomes. We argue that the U.S.’s unilateral use of sanctions against North Korea is building on its instrumental use of the UNSC’s multilateral framework, which has significantly lost its legitimacy and effectiveness amid the looming U.S.-China rivalry over hegemony in Asia.
从心甘情愿的好警察到不情愿的坏警察:联合国对朝鲜制裁的演变
本研究认为,联合国安理会(UNSC)遏制朝鲜核野心的无效和徒劳的努力是美国一贯和战略性地发展其制裁制度的结果,而不是联合国安理会措施的有限执行或中国和俄罗斯这两个倾向于朝鲜的安理会常任理事国的不遵守。美国一直在努力通过巩固双边渠道来提高其外交政策的能力和灵活性,而不是通过联合国安理会加强多边压力,从而最大限度地发挥其对朝鲜的战略影响力。虽然美国和联合国安理会都有东北亚核不扩散的共同目标,但美国故意利用后者决策过程的缺陷,使其外交政策的灵活性最大化。因此,美国在安理会维持强硬立场的同时,灵活地对北韩进行接触和遏制,而联合国安理会对北韩的制裁却逐渐变得僵硬和僵化,没有取得切实的成果。我们认为,美国单方面对北韩实施制裁,是建立在工具性地利用联合国安理会多边框架的基础上的。在美中亚洲霸权竞争日益加剧的情况下,联合国安理会多边框架已明显失去了合法性和有效性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
International Journal of Asia Pacific Studies
International Journal of Asia Pacific Studies SOCIAL SCIENCES, INTERDISCIPLINARY-
CiteScore
0.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
28
审稿时长
20 weeks
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