On Some Arguments for Epistemic Value Pluralism

Abstract

Epistemic Value Monism is the view that there is only one kind of thing of basic, final epistemic value. Perhaps the most plausible version of Epistemic Value Monism is Truth Value Monism, the view that only true beliefs are of basic, final epistemic value. Several authors—notably Jonathan Kvanvig and Michael DePaul—have criticized Truth Value Monism by appealing to the epistemic value of things other than knowledge. Such arguments, if successful, would establish Epistemic Value Pluralism is true and Epistemic Value Monism is false. This paper critically examines those arguments, finding them wanting. However, I develop an argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism that succeeds which turns on general reflection on the nature of value. On a widely held view, true beliefs are of final epistemic value. An interesting question is whether, and why, anything else is. Some authors hold that truth is the most basic thing of final epistemic value, embracing a version of “Epistemic Value Monism” that is sometimes called “Vertisim” or “Truth Value Monism.” Other authors demur, maintaining that the epistemic value of truth cannot explain the epistemic value of everything. Such authors embrace a kind of “Epistemic Value Pluralism.” The debate between Epistemic Value Monists and Pluralists is an important one. For instance, some philosophers might be inclined to understand other epistemic categories—e.g., epistemic obligations or epistemic virtues and vices—in terms of their relation to epistemic value. Clearly settling what is of epistemic value would be important for such projects. Various arguments have been given against Truth Value Monism and in favor of Epistemic Value Pluralism. We can separate those arguments into two categories. Knowledge based Arguments argue that because the epistemic value of truth cannot explain the epistemic value of knowledge we must embrace Epistemic Value Pluralism to explain the epistemic value of knowledge. Non-Knowledge based Arguments argue that the epistemic value of truth cannot explain the epistemic value of things besides knowledge. In other work, I have discussed Knowledge based Arguments and will not discuss them here. Rather, the aim of this paper is to examine Non-Knowledge based Arguments for Epistemic Value Pluralism. I will argue several such arguments fail—they are implausible, obscure, actually consistent with Truth Value Monism, or neglect the relevant distinction between basic and non-basic final value (see below). Nonetheless, I will claim that there is one Non-Knowledge based Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism that succeeds. That argument turns on plausible general claims about final value. After setting the stage in section I, I examine an argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism due to Jonathan Kvanvig in section II. I show how his argument is too obscure to carry force. In section III, I focus on a more straightforward argument from Kvanvig on the nature of understanding. But I argue Kvanvig’s view is actually consistent with Truth Value Monism. In 1 For helpful feedback I thank Dan Buckley, Jordi Cat, Dave Fisher, Adam Leite, Dan Linsenbardt, Mark Kaplan, Tim O'Connor, Andrew Smith, and Harrison Waldo.