Shareholder-Creditor Conflicts and Limits to Arbitrage: Evidence From the Equity Lending Market

Yongqiang Chu, Lu Lin, P. Saffi, Jason Sturgess
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

We show that conflicts of interests between shareholders and creditors affect limits-to-arbitrage through short-sale constraints. Using mergers of financial institutions as a shock to dual ownership, we show that dual holdings of debt and equity increases equity lending supply and reduces short-sale constraints. Shareholders are also less likely to restrict lending supply before shareholder votes when dual holders are present. Further, dual holdings are associated with faster corrections of mispricing, consistent with lower shareholder-creditor conflicts enhancing market efficiency. Our results suggest that shareholder-creditor conflicts give rise to limits to arbitrage and have a real effect on market efficiency.
股东-债权人冲突与套利限制:来自股权借贷市场的证据
我们证明了股东和债权人之间的利益冲突通过卖空约束影响套利限制。利用金融机构合并作为对双重所有权的冲击,我们表明债务和股权的双重持有增加了股权贷款供应并减少了卖空约束。当双重股东在场时,股东在股东投票前限制贷款供应的可能性也较小。此外,双重持有与更快地修正错误定价有关,这与降低股东-债权人冲突提高市场效率相一致。我们的研究结果表明,股东-债权人冲突会限制套利,并对市场效率产生实际影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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