{"title":"Shareholder-Creditor Conflicts and Limits to Arbitrage: Evidence From the Equity Lending Market","authors":"Yongqiang Chu, Lu Lin, P. Saffi, Jason Sturgess","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3747035","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We show that conflicts of interests between shareholders and creditors affect limits-to-arbitrage through short-sale constraints. Using mergers of financial institutions as a shock to dual ownership, we show that dual holdings of debt and equity increases equity lending supply and reduces short-sale constraints. Shareholders are also less likely to restrict lending supply before shareholder votes when dual holders are present. Further, dual holdings are associated with faster corrections of mispricing, consistent with lower shareholder-creditor conflicts enhancing market efficiency. Our results suggest that shareholder-creditor conflicts give rise to limits to arbitrage and have a real effect on market efficiency.","PeriodicalId":11800,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Stock Market Risk (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Stock Market Risk (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3747035","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
We show that conflicts of interests between shareholders and creditors affect limits-to-arbitrage through short-sale constraints. Using mergers of financial institutions as a shock to dual ownership, we show that dual holdings of debt and equity increases equity lending supply and reduces short-sale constraints. Shareholders are also less likely to restrict lending supply before shareholder votes when dual holders are present. Further, dual holdings are associated with faster corrections of mispricing, consistent with lower shareholder-creditor conflicts enhancing market efficiency. Our results suggest that shareholder-creditor conflicts give rise to limits to arbitrage and have a real effect on market efficiency.