Principal-agent theory based incentive mechanism for the electricity universal service

Li-ping Wang, Xin-wu Li, W. Xie, Yanke Zhang
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

From the characteristics of the electricity universal service, this paper studies the problems within the incentive mechanism of the electricity universal service in the market environment. Based on the principal-agent theory, the paper takes into account the cost compensation and economic incentives factors for the power supply enterprises when implementing the electricity universal service, develops a new principal-agent relationship model between the electricity regulatory institutions and power supply enterprises under the asymmetric information situation, designs an optimal incentive contact, analyzes the problems of parameters' assignment in incentive contracts, as well as the influence of incentive contracts towards effort level, mutual earnings, etc. Examples prove that the proposed incentive mechanism could improve the self-earnings while the effort level of electricity universal service provided by power supply enterprises is upgraded, and together with it is the increase of electricity regulatory institutions' utility and social welfare, which in turn stimulates the power supply enterprises to improve the electricity universal service and achieves multilateral wins and the "Pareto Optimality" condition for the electricity universal service.
基于委托代理理论的电力普遍服务激励机制
本文从电力普遍服务的特点出发,研究了市场环境下电力普遍服务激励机制存在的问题。基于委托代理理论,考虑供电企业在实施电力普遍服务时的成本补偿和经济激励因素,建立了信息不对称情况下电力监管机构与供电企业之间新的委托代理关系模型,设计了最优激励契约,分析了激励契约中的参数赋值问题。以及激励契约对努力水平、双方收益等方面的影响。实例证明,所提出的激励机制在提高供电企业电力普遍服务努力水平的同时,可以提高企业的自我收益,同时也可以提高电力监管机构的效用和社会福利。进而刺激供电企业提高电力普遍服务水平,实现电力普遍服务的多边共赢和“帕累托最优”条件。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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