The Proportionality Argument and the Problem of Widespread Causal Overdetermination

IF 0.1 Q3 Arts and Humanities
A. Aliyev
{"title":"The Proportionality Argument and the Problem of Widespread Causal Overdetermination","authors":"A. Aliyev","doi":"10.2478/disp-2020-0016","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The consensus is that repeatable artworks cannot be identified with particular material individuals. A perennial temptation is to identify them with types, broadly construed. Such identification, however, faces the so-called “Creation Problem.” This problem stems from the fact that, on the one hand, it seems reasonable to accept the claims that (1) repeatable artworks are types, (2) types cannot be created, and (3) repeatable artworks are created, but, on the other hand, these claims are mutually inconsistent. A possible solution to the Creation Problem is to argue that claim (2) can be rejected because (a) the only motivation for it is that a type, being abstract, cannot stand in causal relations, but (b) this motivation is ungrounded, since types can, in fact, stand in such relations. Clearly, in order for this solution to be successful, it is necessary to substantiate the possibility of types to be causally efficacious. In this essay, I examine an attempt to do this with the help of Yablo’s principle of proportionality, which has been undertaken by Walters (2013) and, more recently, Juvshik (2018). Although the argument they advance may seem to provide strong support for the causal efficacy of types, I think it actually fails to do this. To explain why this is so, I first show that this argument commits us to the existence of widespread causal overdetermination involving types and then argue that this commitment is both epistemically and ontologically problematic.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"27 1","pages":"331 - 355"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Disputatio (Spain)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2020-0016","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract The consensus is that repeatable artworks cannot be identified with particular material individuals. A perennial temptation is to identify them with types, broadly construed. Such identification, however, faces the so-called “Creation Problem.” This problem stems from the fact that, on the one hand, it seems reasonable to accept the claims that (1) repeatable artworks are types, (2) types cannot be created, and (3) repeatable artworks are created, but, on the other hand, these claims are mutually inconsistent. A possible solution to the Creation Problem is to argue that claim (2) can be rejected because (a) the only motivation for it is that a type, being abstract, cannot stand in causal relations, but (b) this motivation is ungrounded, since types can, in fact, stand in such relations. Clearly, in order for this solution to be successful, it is necessary to substantiate the possibility of types to be causally efficacious. In this essay, I examine an attempt to do this with the help of Yablo’s principle of proportionality, which has been undertaken by Walters (2013) and, more recently, Juvshik (2018). Although the argument they advance may seem to provide strong support for the causal efficacy of types, I think it actually fails to do this. To explain why this is so, I first show that this argument commits us to the existence of widespread causal overdetermination involving types and then argue that this commitment is both epistemically and ontologically problematic.
比例论证与广泛的因果超决定问题
人们的共识是,可重复的艺术品不能与特定的物质个体相一致。一种长期存在的诱惑是将它们与广义的类型区分开来。然而,这种识别面临着所谓的“创造问题”。这个问题源于这样一个事实,一方面,我们似乎可以合理地接受(1)可重复的艺术品是类型,(2)类型不能被创造,(3)可重复的艺术品被创造,但另一方面,这些主张是相互矛盾的。创造问题的一个可能的解决方案是,主张(2)可以被拒绝,因为(A)它的唯一动机是一个抽象的类型不能存在于因果关系中,但(b)这个动机是没有根据的,因为类型实际上可以存在于因果关系中。显然,为了使这个解决方案成功,有必要证实类型在因果关系上有效的可能性。在这篇文章中,我研究了在Yablo的比例原则的帮助下做到这一点的尝试,Walters(2013)和最近的Juvshik(2018)都采用了这个原则。尽管他们提出的论点似乎为类型的因果效应提供了强有力的支持,但我认为它实际上没有做到这一点。为了解释为什么会这样,我首先展示了这一论证使我们相信存在广泛的涉及类型的因果超决定,然后论证了这一论证在认识论和本体论上都存在问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
Disputatio (Spain)
Disputatio (Spain) Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
审稿时长
35 weeks
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信