Philosophical and Legal Understanding of the Concepts: Image, Icon, Image, Honesty, Reputation, Their Manifestations in Criminal Procedural Law

G. V. Sofronov, R. N. Kholstinin
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Introduction. The article presents an attempt for the first time, on the basis of philosophical and legal understanding, to use the concept of “reputation”, which is new for legal scientific circulation. Legal terms, including criminal procedural ones, arise as generic terms. That is, concepts are brought under a common genus, and then specific differences are distinguished. Philosophical categories, due to their universality, cannot be summed up under the genus, and, as a rule, act as a dialectical pair of opposites the thesis and antithesis. Such, for example, are the concepts of essence and phenomenon, necessity and chance, content and form. The complexity of introducing a new concept of reputation into scientific circulation lies in the fact that it does not have its own dialectical antithesis. A bad reputation is also a reputation. At a stretch, reputation can be opposed to discredit, but discredit is an action aimed at undermining reputation, and this is a transition to another kind. Concepts of this kind can be meaningful by analogy. As such, the authors chose the dialectical pair icon image, like foreign-language tracing papers from the Russian word image, which in the legal sense are reduced to reputation. Both that and another (both an icon and an image) are an image, but how different and even opposite are the meanings of these words. Moreover, initially the intentions of the authors were precisely linguistic (and not religious or marketing), and only then the words themselves designated the cultural area of their application.Materials and methods. The theoretical and methodological basis of the study was the hermeneutical approach to the analysis of the concept of "reputation". Methods of systematic, comparative legal analysis, special philosophical and legal research tools were used. The authors used examples from various areas of law criminal procedure, criminal, civil.Research results. Based on the results of the analysis, the question of trust is raised in relation to the procedural status of participants in criminal proceedings. The introduction of the concept of "reputation" as a legal category into legal circulation is proposed.Discussion and conclusion. In the form of a legislative novel, the presumption of good faith of a participant in criminal proceedings is formulated.Presumption of good faith:Everyone is considered conscientious and reasonable, until otherwise is proved in the manner prescribed by this Code and established by a judicial act that has entered into legal force.Everyone is not obliged to prove their conscientiousness and reasonableness. The burden of proving dishonesty, unreasonableness, abuse of right lies with the person who claims the opposite.All doubts about the good faith and reasonableness of a person that cannot be eliminated in the manner prescribed by this Code shall be interpreted in favor of the person whose reputation is questioned.Any procedural actions and (or) decisions of a state body or an official in the field of criminal proceedings, even based on assumptions, cannot be based solely on the fact that a person has a certain procedural status in a case under consideration or another. 
形象、象征、形象、诚信、名誉概念的哲学与法学理解及其在刑事诉讼法中的表现
介绍。本文在哲学和法学认识的基础上,首次尝试使用“名誉”概念,这是法学科学流通中的一个新概念。法律术语,包括刑事诉讼术语,是作为通用术语产生的。也就是说,把概念归到一个共同的属之下,然后再区分具体的差别。哲学的范畴,由于其普遍性,所以不能用类来概括,而通常是辩证的对立面,即正题和反题。例如本质和现象、必然性和偶然性、内容和形式等概念。将一个新的声誉概念引入科学流通的复杂性在于它没有自己的辩证对立面。坏名声也是坏名声。在某种程度上,声誉可以与诋毁相对立,但诋毁是一种旨在破坏声誉的行为,这是向另一种行为的过渡。这类概念通过类比是有意义的。因此,笔者选择了辩证对偶的图标形象,就像俄语单词形象中的外文描摹纸一样,在法律意义上被还原为名誉。这个和另一个(一个图标和一个图像)都是一个图像,但这两个词的含义是多么不同甚至相反。此外,最初作者的意图是精确的语言(而不是宗教或营销),只有在那时,单词本身才指定了其应用的文化领域。材料和方法。本研究的理论和方法基础是对“声誉”概念的解释学分析。本文采用了系统的、比较的法律分析方法,以及专门的哲学和法律研究工具。作者从法律的各个领域——刑事诉讼、刑事、民事——引用了例子。研究的结果。根据分析的结果,对刑事诉讼参与人的程序地位提出了信任问题。建议将“名誉”概念作为法律范畴引入法律流通。讨论与结论。以立法小说的形式,制定了刑事诉讼参与人诚信推定。诚信推定:每个人都被认为是认真和合理的,除非以本法典规定的方式证明并由具有法律效力的司法行为确定。每个人都没有义务证明自己的责任心和合理性。证明不诚实、不合理、滥用权利的责任落在主张相反观点的人身上。对某人的诚信和合理性所产生的一切怀疑,如不能以本法典规定的方式消除,其解释应有利于其名誉受到质疑的人。国家机构或官员在刑事诉讼领域的任何程序性行动和(或)决定,即使是基于假设,也不能仅仅基于某人在正在审议的案件中具有某种程序地位这一事实。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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