Passing on negative interest rates

Pub Date : 2020-12-01 DOI:10.2478/ijme-2020-0022
G. Stadtmann, K. Moritz, Kristin Berthold, Tobias Stadtmann
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Abstract Since the ECB has lowered the interest rate on deposits into negative territory, more and more commercial banks are also passing on this negative interest rate to their customers. The main aim of this paper is to answer the question under which conditions the commercial banking sector will be more or less reluctant to pass the negative deposit rate on to its private customers. We first clarify the circumstances under which demand deposits and excess liquidity arise, and what role quantitative easing plays in this context. Within a game-theoretical framework, it is derived that the pressure to pass on the negative interest rate is particularly high if there are no switching costs, and the banking market follows a Bertrand competition.
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传递负利率
随着欧洲央行将存款利率降至负值,越来越多的商业银行也将这种负利率转嫁给客户。本文的主要目的是回答这样一个问题:在何种条件下,商业银行部门或多或少会不愿意将负存款利率转嫁给私人客户。我们首先澄清活期存款和流动性过剩产生的情况,以及量化宽松在此背景下发挥的作用。在博弈论框架下,如果没有转换成本,则传递负利率的压力特别大,并且银行市场遵循Bertrand竞争。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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