Procedural Fairness and the Cost of Control

IF 1.3 3区 社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Judd B. Kessler, Stephen Leider
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引用次数: 17

Abstract

A large and growing literature has demonstrated that imposing control on agents has the potential to backfire, leading agents to withhold effort. Consistent with principles of procedural fairness, we find that the way in which control is imposed—in particular whether control is imposed symmetrically on both principals and agents and whether both parties have a say in whether control is imposed—affects how agents respond to control. In our setting, control leads agents to withhold effort only when procedural fairness concerns are ignored and control is imposed unilaterally with an asymmetric effect on the agent. (JEL C7, C9, L2, M5)
程序公平与成本控制
越来越多的文献表明,对代理人施加控制可能会适得其反,导致代理人放弃努力。与程序公平原则一致,我们发现控制的施加方式——特别是控制是否对称地施加于委托人和代理人,以及双方是否对控制施加有发言权——影响代理人对控制的反应。在我们的设定中,只有当程序公平问题被忽视,控制被单方面施加,对代理产生不对称的影响时,控制才会导致代理放弃努力。(jel c7, c9, l2, m5)
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
25
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