A secure camouflaged logic family using post-manufacturing programming with a 3.6GHz adder prototype in 65nm CMOS at 1V nominal VDD

N. E. C. Akkaya, B. Erbagci, K. Mai
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引用次数: 20

Abstract

With the continued globalization of the IC manufacturing supply chain, securing that supply chain is becoming increasingly difficult and this opens the door to a myriad of security threats such as unauthorized production, counterfeiting, IP theft, and hardware Trojan Horses. A parallel and related threat is posed by advanced reverse engineering capabilities, such that even chips manufactured at the most advanced technology nodes can be de-layered, imaged, and analyzed [1]. While various manufacturing methodologies and camouflaged gates have been proposed, none fully address these threats, especially in combination. To address these concerns, we use post-manufacturing programmable camouflaged logic topology to simultaneously obscure the design IP from the manufacturer as well as combat reverse engineering. The basis of the design is a threshold-voltage-defined (TVD) logic gate topology that solely uses different threshold voltage implants to determine the logic gate function [2]. Every gate has an identical physical layout and is post-manufacturing programmed with different threshold voltages for different Boolean functions using intentional directed hot-carrier injection (HCI). Similar intentional HCI techniques have previously been used to enhance SRAM margins, boost PUF reliability, and build TRNGs [3][4]. The design is fully compatible with standard CMOS logic processes, requiring no special layers, structures, or process steps.
一个安全的伪装逻辑系列,使用制造后编程,在1V标称VDD下,在65nm CMOS中使用3.6GHz加法器原型
随着集成电路制造供应链的持续全球化,确保供应链的安全变得越来越困难,这为无数的安全威胁打开了大门,例如未经授权的生产,假冒,知识产权盗窃和硬件特洛伊木马。先进的逆向工程能力构成了一个平行的和相关的威胁,例如,即使是在最先进的技术节点上制造的芯片也可以被分层、成像和分析。虽然提出了各种制造方法和伪装门,但没有一个能完全解决这些威胁,特别是在组合中。为了解决这些问题,我们使用制造后可编程伪装逻辑拓扑来同时模糊来自制造商的设计IP以及对抗逆向工程。该设计的基础是阈值电压定义(TVD)逻辑门拓扑,该拓扑仅使用不同的阈值电压植入物来确定逻辑门功能[2]。每个门具有相同的物理布局,并且使用有意定向热载子注入(HCI)对不同布尔函数使用不同的阈值电压进行制造后编程。类似的HCI技术以前被用于提高SRAM的余量,提高PUF的可靠性,以及构建trng[3][4]。该设计与标准CMOS逻辑工艺完全兼容,不需要特殊的层、结构或工艺步骤。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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