The Behavioral Effects of (Unenforceable) Contracts†

IF 1.3 3区 社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Evan Starr, J. Prescott, Norman D. Bishara
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引用次数: 6

Abstract

We study the relationship between employment noncompetition agreements and employee mobility patterns using novel data from the 2014 Noncompete Survey Project. Specifically, we examine how noncompetes relate to the duration and nature of employee mobility, and we leverage our detailed individual-level survey data to identify and explore the precise mechanisms underlying the relationships we observe. We find that individuals with noncompetes appear to exhibit materially longer tenures and are more likely to depart for new employers that do not “compete” with their prior employers. To account for these patterns, we investigate the role noncompetes may play at each stage of the mobility “process”: job search, employer recruitment, offer receipt, negotiation, offer acceptance, etc. We present evidence that employees bound by noncompetes substitute job search activity and receptivity to recruitment in the direction of noncompetitors and that noncompetes are a factor in the choice to turn down approximately 40 percent of the offers employees receive from competitors.
(不可执行的)合同的行为影响
我们利用2014年竞业禁止调查项目的新数据研究了雇佣竞业禁止协议与员工流动模式之间的关系。具体来说,我们研究了竞业禁止与员工流动的持续时间和性质之间的关系,并利用我们详细的个人层面调查数据来识别和探索我们所观察到的关系背后的精确机制。我们发现,拥有竞业禁止的员工似乎表现出更长的任期,并且更有可能跳槽到不与前雇主“竞争”的新雇主。为了解释这些模式,我们研究了非竞争对手在流动“过程”的每个阶段可能发挥的作用:求职、雇主招聘、收到offer、谈判、接受offer等。我们提供的证据表明,受竞业禁止约束的员工会以非竞争对手的方式替代求职活动和对招聘的接受程度,并且竞业禁止是员工选择拒绝来自竞争对手的约40%的工作机会的一个因素。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
25
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