A startling new role for Wilber’s integral model; or how I learned to stop worrying and love perennialism – A response to Abramson

G. Hartelius
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引用次数: 13

Abstract

Critics of Ken Wilber’s work are unfailingly charged with misunderstanding his views. In a recent paper by John Abramson (2014), published in this journal under the title, ‘The misunderstanding and misinterpretation of key aspects of Ken Wilber’s work in Hartelius and Ferrer’s (2013) assessment,’ Hartelius and Ferrer’s paper, ‘Transpersonal Philosophy: The Participatory Turn,’ appearing as Chapter 10 in The Wiley-Blackwell Handbook of Transpersonal Psychology, has met with this same charge. This paper argues that what Abramson (2014) has done is (1) to attempt to inflate semantic issues into the appearance of substantive ones, (2) to conflate Wilber’s assertions with the logical arguments that would establish those assertions, (3) to critique the authors for using points made by Wilber himself, (4) to subtly assert the rightful primacy of Wilber’s model by implying that any debate about it should take place on the territory of its assumptions, (5) to lodge complaints that the authors have failed to co-create some compromise between participatory and integral approaches, and (6) to hold out the prospect that a full account of Wilber’s work would ‘comprehensively dispel’ (p.4) the misunderstandings to which Hartelius and Ferrer (2013) are allegedly subject. Through this retort, Abramson (2014) has attempted to create the appearance that Wilber’s work remains a viable framework for enterprises such as transpersonal psychology – something that seems highly unlikely. This paper further argues that Wilber does not offer a grand scholarly theory of everything, but a problematic metaphysical theory that may nevertheless continue to serve a limited popular audience.
威尔伯的积分模型扮演了一个令人吃惊的新角色;或者我如何学会停止担忧,爱上永恒主义——对艾布拉姆森的回应
肯·威尔伯作品的批评者总是被指责误解了他的观点。在约翰·艾布拉姆森(2014)最近发表在该杂志上的一篇论文中,题为“在Hartelius和Ferrer(2013)的评估中对Ken Wilber工作的关键方面的误解和误解”,Hartelius和Ferrer的论文“超个人哲学:参与性转向”,出现在Wiley-Blackwell超个人心理学手册的第10章中,遇到了同样的指责。本文认为,Abramson(2014)所做的是(1)试图将语义问题膨胀为实质性问题的表象,(2)将Wilber的断言与建立这些断言的逻辑论证混为一谈,(3)批评作者使用Wilber自己提出的观点,(4)通过暗示任何关于Wilber模型的辩论都应该在其假设的领域内进行,巧妙地断言Wilber模型的正当首要地位。(5)提出投诉,认为作者未能在参与式方法和整体方法之间共同创造某种妥协,(6)提出对威尔伯工作的全面描述将“全面消除”(第4页)的前景,这些误解据称是Hartelius和Ferrer(2013)的主题。通过这种反驳,艾布拉姆森(2014)试图创造一种表象,即威尔伯的作品仍然是超个人心理学等企业的可行框架——这似乎极不可能。本文进一步论证,威尔伯并没有提供一个宏大的学术理论,而是一个有问题的形而上学理论,尽管如此,它可能继续为有限的大众受众服务。
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