Competitive Intelligence and the corporate jewels

David Mark
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

The end of the Cold War shifted strategic and tactical foreign policy priorities from traditional superpower and client concerns to those reflecting national economic competitiveness, especially commercial and technology-related information. But while the threat of illegal industrial espionage has increased, so too has the new threat of legal—and systematic—competitive intelligence (CI) efforts by foreign and domestic competitors. Corporate efforts to protect proprietary information, the author argues, have tended to follow the classified-protection model developed to thwart clandestine or illegal intelligence operations, leaving firms unprepared to defend against an organized CI collection effort that analyzes information routinely gathered in the course of the target company's daily business activities. Companies must continue to use physical security against illegal threats while redirecting their thinking to CI protection strategies. It is important to realize that your company will and should lose information if it is effectively carrying out its business operations, and to shift from risk avoidance to risk management. The defensive key is to identify what is absolutely critical for the firm's survival or competitiveness—the “corporate jewels”—and then take action to limit their vulnerability to competitor CI collection. The military's five-step Operations Security (OPSEC) approach for assessing risk and establishing countermeasures can be adapted for competitive intelligence. Also, thinking about counterintelligence should move away from the government-clandestine model to an approach based on Counter-Competitor Intelligence (CCI)—seeking to learn during routine CI activities what intelligence activities competitors are directing at your company, and to analyze any damage. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

竞争情报与企业珠宝
冷战结束后,战略和战术外交政策的重点从传统的超级大国和客户关注转向反映国家经济竞争力的问题,特别是商业和技术相关信息。但是,尽管非法工业间谍活动的威胁有所增加,但国内外竞争对手在合法和系统的竞争情报方面的新威胁也在增加。作者认为,公司保护专有信息的努力往往遵循为挫败秘密或非法情报行动而开发的机密保护模式,使公司没有准备好抵御有组织的CI收集工作,该工作分析目标公司日常商业活动中经常收集的信息。公司必须继续使用物理安全来应对非法威胁,同时将思维转向CI保护策略。重要的是要认识到,如果你的公司有效地开展业务运营,它将而且应该丢失信息,并从风险规避转向风险管理。防御的关键是确定对公司的生存或竞争力至关重要的东西——“企业珠宝”——然后采取行动限制其对竞争对手CI收集的脆弱性。军方评估风险和制定对策的五步行动安全(OPSEC)方法可以适用于竞争情报。此外,反间谍的思考应该从政府的秘密模式转向基于反竞争对手情报(CCI)的方法——在日常的CI活动中了解竞争对手针对你公司的情报活动,并分析任何损害。©1997 John Wiley&;股份有限公司。
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