{"title":"Cartesian Circles and the Analytic Method","authors":"Thomas Feeney","doi":"10.5840/ipq20201120157","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Cartesian Circles and the Analytic Method Thomas Feeney Abstract: The apparently circular arguments in Descartes’s Meditations should be read as analytic arguments, as Descartes himself suggested. This both explains and excuses the appearance of circularity. Analysis “digs out” what is already present in the meditator’s mind but not yet “expressly known” (Letter to Voetius). Once this is achieved, the meditator may take the result of analysis as an epistemic starting point independent of the original argument. That is, analytic arguments may be reversed to yield demonstrative proofs that follow an already workedout order of ideas. The “Cartesian Circle,” for example, is circular only when Descartes’s original analytic argument is mistaken for the demonstration it enables. This approach to Cartesian Circles is unlike the standard approach, which attempts to show that Descartes’s original arguments do work as demonstrations after all.","PeriodicalId":43988,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ipq20201120157","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Cartesian Circles and the Analytic Method Thomas Feeney Abstract: The apparently circular arguments in Descartes’s Meditations should be read as analytic arguments, as Descartes himself suggested. This both explains and excuses the appearance of circularity. Analysis “digs out” what is already present in the meditator’s mind but not yet “expressly known” (Letter to Voetius). Once this is achieved, the meditator may take the result of analysis as an epistemic starting point independent of the original argument. That is, analytic arguments may be reversed to yield demonstrative proofs that follow an already workedout order of ideas. The “Cartesian Circle,” for example, is circular only when Descartes’s original analytic argument is mistaken for the demonstration it enables. This approach to Cartesian Circles is unlike the standard approach, which attempts to show that Descartes’s original arguments do work as demonstrations after all.
期刊介绍:
International Philosophical Quarterly has provided a peer-reviewed forum in English for the international exchange of basic philosophical ideas since 1961. The journal stands in the general tradition of theistic and personalist humanism without further restriction of school or philosophical orientation, and is open to both the philosophical discussion of contemporary issues and historical studies. It is truly international in scope with contributions from authors around the world and circulation to institutions and individuals in 70 countries. IPQ numbers among its Associate Editors scholars from both the Far East and Europe, and the journal enjoys a long-standing relationship with the Facultés Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix in Belgium.