On Two-Valued and Multiple-Valued Logic and on Paradoxes of Verity

Abstract

The phenomena of truth, truthfulness, veracity and “truthiness” discussed widely in logic, epistemology as theory of science and gnoseology as general theory of knowledge, have received many interpretations—and not a single one to be generally accepted. Discussions continue not only upon narrow technical, operational questions of the predicate calculus and/or propositions calculus, but also on logic-gnoseological problems, one of which casts doubt on the maxim “logic is the house of truth,” and the other highlights the laxity of the opposition of “truth—falsehood” meanings as the main categories of the two-valued logic. These evaluations of proposition do not in fact oppose each other in the sense of a contradiction. Verity and falsity are controversial (opposite), but not contradictory (antithetical) concepts; it is truth and non-truth that are contradictory. Therefore, there is not only the possibility, but also the reality of the existence of a field, or zone, of transition between the values “true—false.”