Is the Descriptivist / Cluster Theory of Reference “Wrong from the Fundamentals”?

Abstract

In this paper I suggest that Searle's theory of reference is immune to the specific criticisms that have been levelled against it. I first present an overview of Searle's "cluster" theory, followed by an overview of the Kripkean critique. I then examine in detail Kripke's objections and suggest that they are not sufficient for a rejection of Searle's theory. Finally, I consider several general objections to the cluster theory and argue that they, too, do not suffice to reject it. "When I use a word", Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to meanneither more nor less". "The question is", said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things". Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass Dn Naming and Necessity Kripke rejects the Russellian theory of proper names as neither an adequate nor a correct treatment of ordinary (proper) names.1 Kripke argues (with many others) that the Russellian view fails to account for the significance of the fact that different descriptions may be (and are) used in place of a name to designate an object. So one person might think of Aristotle as 'the teacher of Alexander', another as 'the most famous student of Plato', yet another as 'the author of the Metaphysics', and so on. (Even a single speaker might use these various descriptions at different times when referring to Aristotle). No one of these descriptions could be the meaning of the name 'Aristotle' or else the meaning of the name would be in constant flux. Additionally, the notion of proper names as disguised or shorthand definite descriptions is faulty, for if 'Aristotle' means 'the teacher of Alexander', then the statement 'Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander' would be a tautologysomething it is not. (Indeed, not only is this statement not a tautology, but we could 518 DAVID B. BOERSEMA very well discover that it is false.) So, says Kripke, being the teacher of Alexander cannot be part of [the sense] of the name 'Aristotle'. Kripke then goes on to say that the most common way out of this difficulty with such a view of names is to say that no particular description may be substituted for a name; rather what is needed is a/amily, or cluster, of descriptions. A good example of this, says Kripke, is found in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations.2 Kripke quotes the following part of paragraph 79 as introducing the idea of family resemblances: Consider this example. If one says 'Moses did not exist', this may mean various things. It may mean: the Israelites did not have a single leader when they withdrew from Egypt -or: their leader was not called Moses-or: there cannot have been anyone who accomplished all that the Bible relates of Moses... But when I make a statement about Moses, -am I always ready to substitute some one of these descriptions for 'Moses'? I shall perhaps say: by 'Moses' I understand the man who did what the Bible relates of Moses, or at any rate, a good deal of it. But how much? Have I decided how much must be proved false for me to give up my proposition as false? Has the name 'Moses' got a fixed and unequivocal use for me in all possible cases?