Psychological Incapacity and Moral Incontinence: How the Former Does Not Explain the Latter

Abstract

Moral incontinence (that is, knowing what one ought to do but doing otherwise) has often been explained in terms of psychological incapacity/inability (that is, "ought but can't"). However, Socrates and others have argued that, whenever it is physically possible to act, there can be no rupture between judgment and behavior and therefore there are no instances of "ought but can't". The analysis that follows will conclude either that Socrates was correct in holding that there are no ruptures between judgment and behavior or that, if there are such ruptures, then explanations in terms of psychological incapacity /inability are inappropriate. Of the many ways that moral incontinence (that is, knowing what one ought to do but doing otherwise) has been explained, redescribed, or denied, one of the more common routes has been through an examination of psychological incapacity/inability. The relevance of this approach stems from the Socratic dictum that, provided one is physically capable of acting, one never omits doing those actions that one judges to be what one ought to do. 1 Those who disagree with Socrates usually have explained moral incontinence as being caused by weakness of will, as thai which is traceable to a psychological inability to put into action what reason has deemed ihe most appropriate behavior. In other words, while Socrates denies that (when it is physically possible to act) there can be a rupture between thought and action and therefore, there is no problem of "ought but can't", others have argued that (when it is physically possible to act) there are instances of moral incontinence and such ruptures between thought and action can be explained best in terms of the agent's psychological inability to put into action what reason deemed the most appropriate behavior--thus the problem of "ought but can't".2 The analysis which follows will conclude either that Socrates was correct in holding that there are no ruptures between thought and action or that, if there are such ruptures, then explanations in terms of psychological inability /incapaci ty are inappropriate.