Myths of Self-Transformation in Plato’s Republic

Abstract

In the Republic, a popular interpretation holds that Plato conceives knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) as a cognitive state that exclusively takes metaphysical intelligibles as its objects, i.e., the Good and the Forms. This interpretation claims further that ἐπιστήμη of perceptibles is impossible, such that the highest cognitive achievement one can attain in the perceptible world is opinion (δόξα). I have two main aims. First, I argue that this interpretation fails to convince us as to why the various ἐπιστήμαι of the craftsmen, the non-philosophic citizens, cannot constitute knowledge of a sortal kind. Second, the view seems to undermine Plato’s possible view on scientific knowledge, i.e., a kind of knowledge that plausibly involves observation of concrete phenomena, a thorough study of the observed phenomena, and drawing deductive or indicative conclusions in the perceptible world. I explore Plato’s possible view on scientific knowledge and propose that, among others, the various ἐπιστήμαι of the craftsmen (or most of them) plausibly constitute scientific knowledge, and their cognitive competence should be understood as such.