Introducción de los editores. Las revoluciones de Schiller

Abstract

The following study provides a view of the distinct freedom-from-religion metanarrative in Schiller’s works. The titular distinction between freedom of religion and freedom from religion is intended to emphasize the prerequisites for unfettered exercise of freedom of thought and freedom of conscience; namely, not only the guarantee of freedom to associate with one of the stateapproved religions, but the freedom to choose none of them and the guaranty of freedom from any state, church, majority, or minority coercion through religion. Schiller’s regulative idea regarding religion was the rejection of faith and subject-external belief system (“no religion”). In texts dating back to as early as 1779, Schiller articulates the reasons why religion precludes the possibility of genuine virtue and civilization, and thus hinders the realization of a secular republican vision; he therefore rejects defenses of faith, organized religion, divine judgement, and belief in the afterlife.