El "primer sistema de la libertad" y la "aniquilación de toda libertad". Objeciones de Hegel a la idea fichteana de libertad

Abstract

The Fichtean conception of freedom, even if certainly becomes the first system that frees the human being from the chains of the sensible, does not exceed the framework of the particular, because it refers to the level of self-consciousness that is enclosed in its mere possibility. Hegel's criticism against this conception shows that the particular is precisely the annihilation of the intended freedom advocated by Fichte. The inte- gration of the particular into the universal expressed as an activity involved the true realization of modern subjective freedom identified with the expansion of spirit char- acteristic of the antiquity. A trading system with restrictive laws and a repressive state converted into a tyranny constituted an attack to the true realization of individual wishes integrated in a community.