Revolution, Elite Fear, and Electoral Institutions

IF 2 2区 社会学 Q2 POLITICAL SCIENCE
Haakon Gjerløw, M. Rasmussen
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We present a systemic threat theory to explain the introduction of Proportional Representation (PR). If facing a revolutionary threat, incumbents agree to enact electoral reforms such as PR to secure the stability of the parliamentary system, even if this could imply their own personal electoral loss. We argue that the theory can help explain the largest wave of PR adoptions in history, namely in the years immediately after the Bolshevik revolution in 1917. Incumbents came to over-estimate the true revolutionary threat in Europe. Simultaneously, reformist parliamentarian socialists came to push for PR to weaken the radicals within their party. Incumbents and reformist socialists could therefore support the same system. We test this using qualitative and quantitative data from Norway’s adoption of PR in 1919.
革命、精英恐惧和选举制度
我们提出一个系统威胁理论来解释比例代表制(PR)的引入。如果面临革命威胁,现任者同意实施选举改革,如PR,以确保议会制度的稳定,即使这可能意味着他们自己在选举中失利。我们认为,该理论可以帮助解释历史上最大的PR采用浪潮,即1917年布尔什维克革命后的几年。在位者开始高估欧洲真正的革命威胁。与此同时,改革派的议会社会主义者开始推动PR,以削弱党内的激进分子。因此,现任政府和改革派社会主义者可能会支持同样的制度。我们使用挪威在1919年采用PR的定性和定量数据来验证这一点。
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来源期刊
Comparative Politics
Comparative Politics POLITICAL SCIENCE-
CiteScore
4.60
自引率
4.30%
发文量
33
期刊介绍: Comparative Politics, an international journal presenting scholarly articles devoted to the comparative analysis of political institutions and processes,communicates new ideas and research findings to social scientists, scholars, students, and public and NGO officials. The journal is indispensable to experts in universities, research organizations, foundations, embassies, and policymaking agencies throughout the world.
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