Ideas of Intelligence: Divergent National Concepts and Institutions. (Intelligence)

Q4 Social Sciences
P. Davies
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引用次数: 36

Abstract

Since World War II, much effort has gone into defining "intelligence." This effort has even given rise to what is sometimes called intelligence theory, which can be traced to Sherman Kent's desire to see intelligence programmatically examined, addressed, and subsumed by the mainstream social science tradition. During World War II Kent served in the Bureau of Analysis and Estimates of the US Office of Strategic Services, and later headed the Office of National Estimates of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Virtually all intelligence theory could be considered a footnote to Kent. His conviction that intelligence should be a broad-based analytical discipline is embodied in his maxim "intelligence is knowledge," which has set the precedent for most subsequent debate. Since Kent's day, many alternative approaches to intelligence have been suggested by a succession of authors. In his 1996 Intelligence Power in Peace and War, British scholar and former intelligence officer Michael Herman tried to present the range of conceptualizations of intelligence as a spectrum, ranging from the broad definitions that approach intelligence primarily as "all-source analysis" (typified by Kent's view) to narrow interpretations that focus on intelligence collection, particularly covert collection. Herman notes in passing that the broader interpretations tend to be favored by US writers and narrow approaches by the British. What Herman does not pursue, however, is the fundamental difference this matter of definition effects in the British and US approaches to intelligence and how those conceptual differences have been reflected in their respective intelligence institutions and in legislation. It is entirely possible that by asking "what is intelligence?" we may be barking up the wrong intell ectual tree. The real questions should perhaps be "How do different countries and institutions define intelligence?" and "What are the consequences of those different definitions?" A Study in Contrast Conceptual divergences in the concept of intelligence are particularly worth keeping in mind when comparing Britain and the United States. The 1995 US Congressional Aspin/Brown Commission examined the British national intelligence machinery. Likewise, one of the first actions of the British Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee after its creation under the 1994 Intelligence Services Act was a similar evaluation of US methodologies. Neither side found anything to incorporate from the other's methods, and yet neither seemed to detect that they were talking--and hence thinking--about entirely different things when they were talking about intelligence. To a large degree, transatlantic dialogue on the subject of intelligence has tended to be conducted at cross-purposes. In current usage, "intelligence in US parlance tends to refer to "finished" intelligence that has been put through the all-source analysis process and turned into a product that can provide advice and options for decision makers. Perhaps the classic US definition comes from a past edition of the Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage, which states that intelligence is "the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information which concerns one or more as pects of foreign nations or areas of operation which is immediately or potentially significant for planning." This definition includes the collection of raw information, but the end result does not become "intelligence" as such until it has been thoroughly analyzed. Hence, in the US context, intelligence production means analytical production. This very broad sense of the term intelligence was used as far back as 1949 when Kent argued that intelligence consists of three "substantive" elements: first, descriptive background; second, reportorial current information and threats, the "most important complicated element of strategic intelligence"; and third, the "substantive-evaluative" analytical process of evaluation and "extrapolation. …
智力观念:不同的国家概念和制度。(智力)
自第二次世界大战以来,很多人都在努力定义“情报”。这种努力甚至产生了所谓的智力理论,这可以追溯到谢尔曼·肯特(Sherman Kent)的愿望,即看到智力被主流社会科学传统程序化地检查、处理和纳入。第二次世界大战期间,肯特曾在美国战略情报局的分析和评估局任职,后来担任美国中央情报局国家评估办公室主任。几乎所有的智力理论都可以看作是肯特的注脚。他坚信智力应该是一门基础广泛的分析学科,这体现在他的格言“智力就是知识”中,这为后来的大多数辩论开创了先例。自肯特的时代以来,许多作家相继提出了许多不同的智力研究方法。在1996年出版的《和平与战争中的情报力量》一书中,英国学者、前情报官员迈克尔·赫尔曼(Michael Herman)试图将情报概念化的范围呈现为一个光谱,从将情报主要定义为“全来源分析”(以肯特的观点为代表)的广义定义到专注于情报收集,特别是秘密收集的狭义解释。赫尔曼顺便指出,美国作家倾向于更广泛的解读,而英国作家则倾向于狭隘的解读。然而,赫尔曼没有追求的是,英国和美国情报方法中定义影响的根本差异以及这些概念上的差异是如何在各自的情报机构和立法中反映出来的。问“什么是智力”,我们完全有可能找错了对象。真正的问题也许应该是“不同的国家和机构如何定义智力?”以及“这些不同定义的后果是什么?”对比研究在比较英国和美国时,智力概念上的差异尤其值得牢记。1995年,美国国会阿斯平/布朗委员会审查了英国的国家情报机构。同样,英国议会情报和安全委员会根据1994年《情报服务法》成立后的第一批行动之一,就是对美国的方法进行类似的评估。双方都没有从对方的方法中找到任何可以借鉴的东西,然而,双方似乎都没有意识到,当他们谈论智力时,他们谈论的——因此思考的——是完全不同的事情。在很大程度上,大西洋两岸关于情报问题的对话往往是在目的不同的情况下进行的。在目前的用法中,“情报”在美国的说法中往往指的是“完成”的情报,这些情报已经经过了所有来源的分析过程,并变成了一种可以为决策者提供建议和选择的产品。也许美国的经典定义来自于上一版的《美国联合使用军事术语词典》,它指出情报是“收集、评估、分析、整合和解释所有可用信息的产物,这些信息涉及一个或多个外国或行动领域,对计划具有直接或潜在的重要意义。”这个定义包括原始信息的收集,但最终结果在经过彻底分析之前不能成为“情报”。因此,在美国的背景下,情报生产意味着分析生产。早在1949年,肯特就认为智力由三个“实质性”要素组成,即描述背景;第二,报告当前的信息和威胁,这是“战略情报中最重要的复杂因素”;第三,评价和外推的“实质-评价”分析过程。…
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来源期刊
Harvard International Review
Harvard International Review Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
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期刊介绍: The HIR features underappreciated topics in the international affairs discourse and underappreciated perspectives on more widely discussed topics. The HIR aims to serve as a trend-setter among similar publications by directing rather than following the public’s attention. The HIR presents a variety of scholarly content in an accessible style and format. It makes the arguments of scholars, policymakers, and other international affairs actors available to a wider audience. The HIR seeks both academic and lay readers who wish to think seriously about international affairs.
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