Impact of Dividend and Leverage on Free Cash Flow in The Context of Agency Problem: Evidence from Pakistan

IF 0.1 Q4 BUSINESS
Huzaifa Jabbar Chauhan, Zia-ur-Rehman Rao
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Objective: The purpose of this paper is to study the agency theory problem. To test the free cash flow (FCF) hypothesis to reduce the agency theory in firms operating in Pakistan. Further, this paper gives an overview of financial reporting conditions and corporate governance practices. Design/methodology/approach: This study has applied panel regression on data. It is collected from 2010 to 2017 from companies listed in the Pakistan stock exchange. This paper used the Fixed and Random effect model to test the relationship. The current study collected data from 119 companies from the stock exchange of Pakistan. Findings: We find that the free cash flow hypothesis exists in firms listed in the Pakistan stock exchange. Debt is the more proper approach to reduce the free cash flows in management control than the dividend. Furthermore, we find that capital expenditure adds to the value of the firms. Originality/value: This study is the first analysis of the agency theory problem to measure the effectiveness of the free cash flow (FCF) hypothesis in the context of public sector nonfinancial firms in the Pakistan Stock exchange. The study contributes to the literature of corporate laws, agency theory, and the dividend payment patterns adopted by firms.
代理问题背景下股利与杠杆对自由现金流的影响:来自巴基斯坦的证据
目的:研究代理理论问题。以在巴基斯坦经营的企业为研究对象,检验自由现金流(FCF)假说对减少代理理论的影响。此外,本文还概述了财务报告条件和公司治理实践。设计/方法/方法:本研究对数据采用面板回归。它是从2010年至2017年从巴基斯坦证券交易所上市的公司收集的。本文采用固定和随机效应模型来检验两者之间的关系。目前的研究收集了巴基斯坦证券交易所119家公司的数据。研究发现:自由现金流假说存在于巴基斯坦证券交易所上市公司中。债务是减少管理控制下的自由现金流比股息更合适的方法。此外,我们发现资本支出增加了企业的价值。原创性/价值:本研究首次分析了在巴基斯坦证券交易所公共部门非金融公司背景下衡量自由现金流(FCF)假设有效性的代理理论问题。本研究对公司法、代理理论和企业股利支付模式的研究都有贡献。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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