Real options bargaining games

IF 3.2 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
E. Rychłowska‑Musiał
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

The real options approach has been supporting investment decision-making processes for years. However, on competitive markets, the real options games approach is the more suitable way. In this article, a real options game subject to analysis is the situation in which two companies with different market share are exploring an opportunity to implement a new investment project. It is known that competition on the market reduces the scope of benefits a company can gain whilst implementing the project. In this paper, we show that this reduction can be mitigated by taking into account payoff transfer designated as a bargaining solution. We discuss three main types of games between companies that we can observe on the market; then we analyze their bargaining solutions, and finally—come up with recommendations to companies. A firm that dominates its respective market usually benefits by implementing the most advantageous strategy, but in certain situations it should pay special attention to its weaker competitor’s opportunities and try to anticipate its movements. In the paper, we show that with high project risk and significant asymmetry in the firms’ market share, a weaker company may still hold all the cards.
实物期权议价博弈
实物期权方法多年来一直支持投资决策过程。然而,在竞争性市场中,实物期权博弈方法是更合适的方法。在本文中,要分析的实物期权博弈是两家拥有不同市场份额的公司正在探索实施新投资项目的机会的情况。众所周知,市场上的竞争减少了公司在实施项目时可以获得的利益范围。在本文中,我们证明了这种减少可以通过考虑指定为讨价还价解决方案的支付转移来缓解。我们将讨论市场上公司间的三种主要游戏类型;然后我们分析他们的议价方案,最后提出给公司的建议。主导其各自市场的公司通常通过实施最有利的战略而受益,但在某些情况下,它应该特别注意其较弱竞争对手的机会,并试图预测其行动。在本文中,我们证明了在高项目风险和企业市场份额显著不对称的情况下,较弱的企业可能仍然握有所有的牌。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
1.90%
发文量
14
审稿时长
12 weeks
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