The Realism of Purposes: Schelling and Hegel on Kant’s Critique of Teleological Judgement

Abstract

The paper addresses Schelling’s and Hegel’s interpretation of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgement (1790), focusing especially on the so-called ‘problem of teleology.’ We reconstruct Schelling’s and Hegel’s reading of the second part of the Critique, dedicated to ‘teleological judgement’ and the question of natural purposiveness. We first propose a brief reconstruction of Kant’s argument about the possibility of using teleological judgment with reference to nature; we then show why Hegel and Schelling were unsatisfied with Kant’s argument; Finally, we argue that Schelling’s and Hegel’s dissatisfaction with the Kantian theory of teleological judgement led them to move beyond Kant, towards a different understanding of the relation between epistemology and ontology.