The nature of humanism and materialism of Marx’s concept of man

Abstract

This paper is devoted to clarification of Marx’s view of man in terms of his special humanism and materialism. The authors argue that Marx’s works contain normative elements and the basic value for him is free human self-realization. But this self-realization doesn’t serve as a mean for embodiment of certain human ideals; it is the end in itself. So, the authors qualify Marx’s position in comparison with other kinds of humanism as non-directed anthropocentrism. Marx rejects the autonomy of abstract ethics, as well as any abstract categories, and raises the significance of human practice as the process of life’s actualization. In this context, the historical materialism of Marx appears closely related to his conception of man as an active agent of history and creator of material world: significant part of material world is interpreted by Marx as the estranged and objectified human subjectivity; nature and man are perceived as the dialectical unity, and the first one acquires its significance only as the living space of the second. This allowed the authors to propose the term “subjective materialism” for defining Marx’s approach. Even in Marx’s later works, the historical task of developing productive forces appears to be permeated with the general humanistic goal of full human liberation and recovery its primacy in relation to the external world. And this task appears to be the key trend of the history in the Marx’s conception.