China's Policy toward North Korea under the XI Jinping Leadership

Q1 Arts and Humanities
H. N. Kim
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

IntroductionWith its geographic proximity, historical and cultural ties, and ideological affinity, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has occupied an important place in the conduct of China's foreign policy. Following the Chinese intervention in the Korean War (1950-1953), which saved the DPRK from its demise, China signed a treaty of friendship and alliance with North Korea in 1961, which is still in effect today. As North Korea's economy deteriorated as a result of the so-called military first policy of the Kim Jong-Il regime from the latter part of the 1990s, China provided increasingly larger amounts of economic aid to its impoverished ally, while shielding it diplomatically and politically from the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council for Pyongyang's violations of international agreements on the denuclearization of North Korea. China is estimated to provide over 90 percent of North Korea's energy imports, 80 percent of its consumer goods and 45 percent of its food.1Under the Hu Jintao government (2002-2012), China's Korea policy revolved around three basic concerns: prevention of the collapse of the North Korean regime, preservation of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. First, China did not want to see the collapse of the North Korean regime, as North Korea provided a valuable buffer zone between China and South Korea where over 28,000 U.S. troops remain stationed. If the North Korean regime collapsed, or were absorbed by South Korea, China would have to face a unified Korea controlled by the capitalist South and allied with the United States. Such a contingency would mean not only the loss of a valuable buffer zone but also a considerable burden on China's national defense, for as many as one-fifth (or 400,000) of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) may need to be deployed along the Sino-Korean border to ensure China's national security.2 Second, China desired to prevent the outbreak of another war in Korea, for that could embroil China in an unwanted war because of its alliance with North Korea. In order for China to continue its economic development and "peaceful rise," it needed a peaceful international environment in East Asia, especially on the Korean Peninsula. Third, China also became concerned about North Korea's nuclear weapons program, for the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by North Korea would trigger a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia, as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan would likely be compelled to counter the North's move by developing their own nuclear weapons programs. Such a development would not be conducive to the maintenance of China's special status as the sole legitimate nuclear power in the region. As a result, China became involved in the politics of denuclearization of North Korea through the Six-Party Talks in and after 2003.Throughout the Kim Jong-Il's rule in North Korea (1994-2011), China's priority was the survival of the North Korean regime (or preventing its collapse). Such a priority did not change immediately after Jong-Il's death, for China's overriding concern was the preservation of North Korea through the successful consolidation of power by Kim Jong-Un. As a result, the Hu Jintao leadership decided to help Jong- Un's consolidation of power by endorsing the legitimacy of the new regime from the very beginning. At the same time, China also wanted a more cooperative new North Korean regime which would help stabilize the situation on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea under Kim Jong-Il had been a political liability and economic burden to China, as that regime defied the international community by perpetrating numerous provocations and crises. Pyongyang carried out missile and nuclear weapons tests in 2006 and 2009 in violation of international agreements. Furthermore, Pyongyang sank a South Korean warship, Cheonan, in March 2010 and shelled South Korea's Yeonpyeong Island, killing over 50 soldiers and civilians, in November of the same year. …
朝鲜民主主义人民共和国地理位置相近,历史文化相通,思想相通,在中国外交政策中占有重要地位。在中国介入朝鲜战争(1950-1953),使朝鲜免于灭亡之后,中国于1961年与朝鲜签署了友好同盟条约,该条约至今仍然有效。由于金正日政权从上世纪90年代后期开始实行所谓的“先军政策”,朝鲜经济每况愈下,中国向这个贫困的盟友提供了越来越多的经济援助,同时在外交和政治上庇护朝鲜免受联合国安理会(UN Security Council)因朝鲜违反有关朝鲜无核化的国际协议而实施的制裁。据估计,朝鲜90%以上的能源进口、80%的消费品和45%的食品来自中国。首先,中国不希望看到朝鲜政权崩溃,因为朝鲜在中国和韩国之间提供了一个宝贵的缓冲区,那里驻扎着超过2.8万名美军。如果朝鲜政权崩溃,或者被韩国吞并,中国将不得不面对一个由资本主义的韩国控制并与美国结盟的统一朝鲜。这种突发事件不仅意味着失去一个宝贵的缓冲区,而且对中国的国防也是一个相当大的负担,因为多达五分之一(或40万)的中国人民解放军(PLA)可能需要沿着中朝边境部署,以确保中国的国家安全第二,中国希望防止在朝鲜爆发另一场战争,因为这可能会使中国卷入一场不想要的战争,因为它与朝鲜结盟。为了使中国继续其经济发展和“和平崛起”,它需要一个和平的东亚国际环境,特别是在朝鲜半岛。第三,中国也开始担心朝鲜的核武器计划,因为朝鲜获得核能力将引发东北亚的核军备竞赛,因为日本、韩国和台湾可能会被迫通过发展自己的核武器计划来对抗朝鲜的举动。这样的发展将不利于维护中国作为该地区唯一合法核大国的特殊地位。因此,中国在2003年及之后通过六方会谈参与了朝鲜无核化的政治。在金正日统治朝鲜期间(1994-2011),中国的首要任务是朝鲜政权的生存(或防止其崩溃)。在金正日去世后,这一优先事项并没有立即改变,因为中国最关心的是通过金正恩成功巩固权力来保护朝鲜。与此同时,中国也希望一个更加合作的新朝鲜政权,这将有助于稳定朝鲜半岛的局势。金正日统治下的朝鲜一直是中国的政治负担和经济负担,因为该政权无视国际社会,犯下了无数的挑衅和危机。平壤在2006年和2009年违反国际协议进行了导弹和核武器试验。此外,平壤在2010年3月击沉了韩国军舰“天安号”,并在同年11月炮击了韩国的延坪岛,造成50多名士兵和平民死亡。…
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
North Korean Review
North Korean Review Arts and Humanities-History
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0.70
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