North Korea's Insecurity Dilemma *

Abstract

Introduction: Security and Insecurity DilemmasNorth Korea has a long history of brinkmanship, using incendiary rhetoric often aimed at its target's deepest fears to improve Pyongyang's leverage. In addition, ever since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the infamous "Axis of Evil" speech, much has been written about the United States' aggressive unilateralism and the heightened possibility of war on the Korean Peninsula.1 Events such as reports of the North Koreans restarting their nuclear program, the United States attacking the first member of the Axis, and the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel may be seen to have brought such a conflict even closer.2In traditional security and strategic analysis, the military capabilities of one state, even if they are perceived by that state as being for defensive purposes (to deter others from aggression), are viewed by other states as a potential threat.3 This is referred to as the security dilemma. Thus North Korean acquisition of enhanced military capabilities, particularly those with long-range force projection (such as missiles) or mass destruction potential (such as nuclear weapons), is seen as posing a threat to the security of other parties.However, this paper contends that it is not the increasing strength of North Korea that poses the threat to regional security, but rather Pyongyang's increasing weakness- an "insecurity dilemma"4 rather than a security dilemma. For Georg Sorenson an insecurity dilemma exists when inwardly weak but outwardly strong states pose an intervention dilemma for liberal states-they do not pose a threat to others, but do pose a threat to their own people.5 The term is used slightly differently here in that inward vulnerability is projected outwards as a diversionary and unifying tactic, thereby causing international uncertainty and instability and even potential security threats to neighboring states and their allies, almost as a form of collateral damage.Increased ThreatsIn the wake of a second, more successful North Korean nuclear weapon test on May 25, 2009, and the test-firing of more missiles on the following day, South Korea and the United States upgraded the threat level and readiness of their forces to the second highest level.6 The UN Security Council issued statements of concern and criticism, and on June 12 passed UN Security Council Resolution 1874 (with the support of both China and Russia) condemning Pyongyang's actions, increasing existing sanctions, and adding some new provisions aimed at curtailing the regime's nuclear activities.7South Korea also announced it would join the Proliferation Security Initiative, leading to the prospect of South Korean personnel boarding North Korean vessels.8 Pyongyang responded by issuing belligerent statements, including that it would consider any search or seizure of its vessels as an act of war to which it would respond with a military strike. On May 27 North Korea announced it was abandoning the truce that ended the Korean War.9 In response to UN Security Council Resolution 1874 the North Koreans asserted that "it has become an absolutely impossible option for North Korea to even think about giving up its nuclear weapons."10 Indeed, spokespersons and commentators on both sides have described threats emanating from the other as constituting more than the usual saber rattling.11In examining the increased threat posed by an actor it is important to assess the two components of threat individually: (1) an increased capability of the actor to inflict harm and (2) an increased desire or intent to do so. The importance of recent developments in Northeast Asia is not only that more successful nuclear and missile tests suggest increased North Korean capability, but also that they, along with the nation's bellicose statements, may be perceived as indicating more hostile intent. However, the degree to which North Korean actions and rhetoric demonstrate an increase in threat capability or intent is subject to debate. …