Is North Korea Putting All of the Eggs in One Basket

Abstract

On May 12, 2008, the 11th International Trade Fair opened at the Three- Revolution Building in Pyongyang.1 During the months leading to the trade fair, much ado was made as North Koreans cleaned streets, decorated buildings, and prepared for the much expected trade fair. According to the North Korean government, more than 220 companies would participate in the fair, displaying various products, such as "electronic appliances, vehicles, petrochemical goods, medicines, daily necessities, foodstuffs, etc." (Korean Central News Agency [KCNA],May 5, 2008). It was supposed to be a major international fair with all sorts of consumer products from all around the world. When the fair finally opened with great fanfare, however, outside observers as well as North Korean citizens were perplexed to witness thatmore than 90 percent of products were Chinese products. As one reporter pointed out, the so-called international fair was practically a Chinese expo (Joongang Ilbo, May 15, 2008).The incident is symbolic in that Beijing has emerged as the outlet of North Korea to the outside world. In 2000, China constituted 25 percent of the North Korean trade. By 2009, the figure rose to 78.5 percent. As a result, there is little difference between a Chinese expo and an "international fair" fromthe viewpoint of Pyongyang. The main goal of this paper is to analyze the increasing North Korean dependence on Beijing and provide some policies to deal with it. In the first section, the divergence between the North Korean rhetoric of "self-reliance" and its dependence on socialist aids during the cold war is analyzed. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Pyongyang became heavily dependent on China. In the second section, the North Korean overdependence on China is investigated. As many scholars point out, dependence comes at the price of vulnerability. Pyongyang paid its price of overdependence as Beijing squeezed its vulnerable points during the nuclear crisis. In the third section, the vulnerability of North Korea is analyzed. In response to the tightening grip of China, Pyongyang has become increasingly sensitive to its vulnerability. In the fourth section, North Korea's recent efforts to distance itself from China are investigated. Finally, policy recommendations are discussed in the conclusion to alleviate the North Korean dependence on China.Behind the Rhetoric of "Self-reliance"Although Moscow engineered the establishment of North Korea, Stalin looked the other way when its initial victory during the KoreanWar (1950-1953) was reversed due to the U.S. intervention.2With the fate of North Korea hanging by a thread, Mao Zedong intervened with his "voluntary" army.3 The fact that China-and only China-came to the rescue of North Korea was not forgotten. The war experience solidified the two countries as "blood allies." Leaders of both countries have often invoked the expression "teeth and lips" to describe their solidarity. Like lips and teeth, it is argued, the fate of China and North Korea is inseparable.As the cold war deepened, however, Pyongyang increasingly emphasized the Chuch'e ideology as the guiding spirit of the country. According to Kim Il Sung, the Chuch'e ideology was composed of three principles: North Korea should be "politically independent," "militarily self-defensive," and "economically self-reliant." Taken together, it meant "an independent stand of discarding the spirit of relying on others, displaying the spirit of self-reliance." Especially, a self-reliant economy was important because when a country became dependent on others, it could degenerate into "colonial enslavement."4 As a result, Kim Il Sung argued that North Korea should adopt a Chuch'e economy with its own resources, labor, and technologies.While "lips" pursued self-reliance, the "teeth" explored a different path. When Deng Xiaoping came to power, he pursued a market-friendly reform. In 1984 when the reform accelerated, Kim Il Sung was invited to China. …