Gotta Get Those Ill-Gotten Gains: Improving the FTC's Authority to Seek Disgorgement in Antitrust Cases

IF 2.1 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Kathryn Buggs
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Abstract

Disgorgement is an equitable monetary remedy that requires a defendant to give up all ill-gotten gains from their illegal conduct. Unlike damages, which can be compensatory, deterrent, or even punitive in nature, disgorgement focuses primarily on deterring future illegal conduct. It relies on the simple moral premise that wrongdoers should not be allowed to retain the profits of their wrongdoing. Especially in antitrust litigation involving complex, multilayered supply chains, damages can underestimate the true harm suffered as a result of anticompetitive conduct. Disgorgement, if calculated properly and litigated thoughtfully, has the potential to provide redress for the full amount of harm and therefore act as a more efficient deterrent. Federal and state antitrust enforcers have sought disgorgement for anticompetitive conduct with limited success, and a recent Supreme Court decision casts doubt on the Federal Trade Commission’s authority to seek disgorgement altogether. Still, there is bipartisan support in Congress and the White House to restore the FTC’s disgorgement authority. This Note proposes enacting legislation to that effect, including a provision that would allow state attorneys general or private plaintiffs to seek disgorgement on the FTC’s behalf (called a “qui tam” provision). Further, this Note outlines how leveraging existing litigation tools can alleviate concerns that disgorgement will lead to duplicative recovery. By restoring the FTC’s authority to seek disgorgement and creating a qui tam mechanism for private enforcement, antitrust plaintiffs will benefit from increased leverage, enabling them to both recover the totality of harm caused by anticompetitive conduct and deter such conduct in the future.
必须得到那些不义之财:提高联邦贸易委员会在反垄断案件中寻求撤销的权力
追缴是一种衡平法上的金钱救济,要求被告放弃其非法行为的所有不义之财。损害赔偿可以是补偿性的、威慑性的,甚至是惩罚性的,与之不同的是,追缴财产主要侧重于阻止未来的非法行为。它依赖于一个简单的道德前提,即不应允许不法行为者保留其不法行为的利润。特别是在涉及复杂、多层次供应链的反垄断诉讼中,损害赔偿可能低估了反竞争行为所造成的真正损害。如果计算得当并经过深思熟虑地提起诉讼,追缴有可能为全部损害提供补偿,从而发挥更有效的威慑作用。联邦和州的反垄断执法机构曾因反竞争行为寻求拆分,但收效甚微,最近最高法院的一项裁决让人对联邦贸易委员会(Federal Trade Commission)寻求拆分的权力产生了怀疑。不过,国会和白宫两党都支持恢复联邦贸易委员会的分赃权。本说明建议为此制定立法,包括允许州总检察长或私人原告代表联邦贸易委员会寻求撤销的条款(称为“qui tam”条款)。此外,本说明还概述了如何利用现有的诉讼工具来减轻人们对分类将导致重复追回的担忧。通过恢复联邦贸易委员会寻求拆分的权力,并为私人执法创建一个小组机制,反垄断原告将从增加的杠杆中受益,使他们既能收回反竞争行为造成的全部损害,又能在未来阻止此类行为。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.80
自引率
3.70%
发文量
38
期刊介绍: The Michigan Law Review is a journal of legal scholarship. Eight issues are published annually. Seven of each volume"s eight issues ordinarily are composed of two major parts: Articles by legal scholars and practitioners, and Notes written by the student editors. One issue in each volume is devoted to book reviews. Occasionally, special issues are devoted to symposia or colloquia. First Impressions, the online companion to the Michigan Law Review, publishes op-ed length articles by academics, judges, and practitioners on current legal issues. This extension of the printed journal facilitates quick dissemination of the legal community’s initial impressions of important judicial decisions, legislative developments, and timely legal policy issues.
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