Error Aversions and Due Process

IF 2.1 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Brandon L. Garrett, G. Mitchell
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

William Blackstone famously expressed the view that convicting the innocent constitutes a much more serious error than acquitting the guilty. This view is the cornerstone of due process protections for those accused of crimes, giving rise to the presumption of innocence and the high burden of proof required for criminal convictions. While most legal elites share Blackstone’s view, the citizen jurors tasked with making due process protections a reality do not share the law’s preference for false acquittals over false convictions. Across multiple national surveys sampling more than 12,000 people, we find that a majority of Americans consider false acquittals and false convictions to be errors of equal magnitude. Contrary to Blackstone, most people are unwilling to err on the side of letting the guilty go free to avoid convicting the innocent. Indeed, a sizeable minority view false acquittals as worse than false convictions; this group is willing to convict multiple innocent persons to avoid letting one guilty person go free. These value differences translate into behavioral differences: we show in multiple studies that jury-eligible adults who reject Blackstone’s view are more accepting of prosecution evidence and are more conviction-prone than the minority of potential jurors who agree with Blackstone. These findings have important implications for our understanding of due process and criminal justice policy. Due process currently depends on jurors faithfully following instructions on the burden of proof, but many jurors are not inclined to hold the state to its high burden. Courts should do away with the fiction that the reasonable doubt standard guarantees due process and consider protections that do not depend on jurors honoring the law’s preference for false acquittals, such as more stringent pretrial screening of criminal cases and stricter limits on prosecution evidence. Further, the fact that many people place crime control on par with, or above, the need to avoid wrongful convictions helps explain divisions in public opinion on important policy questions like bail and sentencing reform. Criminal justice proposals that emphasize deontic concerns without addressing consequentialist concerns are unlikely to garner widespread support.
避免错误和正当程序
威廉·布莱克斯通(William Blackstone)有一个著名的观点,即判定无辜者有罪比宣告有罪要严重得多。这一观点是为被控犯罪的人提供正当程序保护的基石,导致了无罪推定和刑事定罪所需的高额举证责任。虽然大多数法律精英都赞同布莱克斯通的观点,但负责实现正当程序保护的公民陪审员并不赞同法律对虚假无罪释放的偏好,而不是虚假定罪。在对超过1.2万人进行的多项全国性调查中,我们发现,大多数美国人认为虚假无罪释放和虚假定罪是同等严重的错误。与布莱克斯通相反,大多数人都不愿意为了避免让无辜者定罪而放了有罪的人。事实上,相当多的少数人认为虚假无罪释放比虚假定罪更糟糕;这个组织愿意给多个无辜的人定罪,以避免让一个有罪的人逍遥法外。这些价值差异转化为行为差异:我们在多项研究中表明,与少数同意布莱克斯通观点的潜在陪审员相比,反对布莱克斯通观点的符合陪审团资格的成年人更容易接受检方证据,也更容易定罪。这些发现对我们理解正当程序和刑事司法政策具有重要意义。正当程序目前取决于陪审员忠实地遵循关于举证责任的指示,但许多陪审员并不倾向于要求州政府承担高昂的举证责任。法院应该摒弃合理怀疑标准保证正当程序的幻想,并考虑不依赖于陪审员遵守法律对虚假无罪释放的偏好的保护措施,例如更严格的刑事案件审前筛选和对控方证据的更严格限制。此外,许多人认为控制犯罪与避免错误定罪同等重要,甚至更重要,这一事实有助于解释公众在保释和量刑改革等重要政策问题上的分歧。强调道义问题而不解决结果主义问题的刑事司法提案不太可能获得广泛支持。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.80
自引率
3.70%
发文量
38
期刊介绍: The Michigan Law Review is a journal of legal scholarship. Eight issues are published annually. Seven of each volume"s eight issues ordinarily are composed of two major parts: Articles by legal scholars and practitioners, and Notes written by the student editors. One issue in each volume is devoted to book reviews. Occasionally, special issues are devoted to symposia or colloquia. First Impressions, the online companion to the Michigan Law Review, publishes op-ed length articles by academics, judges, and practitioners on current legal issues. This extension of the printed journal facilitates quick dissemination of the legal community’s initial impressions of important judicial decisions, legislative developments, and timely legal policy issues.
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