Federal Pleading Standards in State Court

IF 2.1 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Mark Gadson
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Most state courts cannot follow both their state constitutions and federal pleading standards. Even if they could, policy considerations unique to states compel state courts to reject federal pleading standards. This is because federal courts have changed pleading standards to allow judges to make factual determinations on a motion to dismiss and to require more factual detail in complaints. While scholars have vigorously debated whether these changes are wise, just, and permissible under the federal rules and the Constitution, they have ignored the even more important questions of whether state courts can and should adopt those pleading standards. The oversight is particularly worrisome because so many state courts are currently struggling with those questions while hearing fifty times as many cases a year as federal courts do. Indeed, questions about pleading standards that deserve the most scholarly attention have received the least. This Article answers these questions with a definitive “no.” First, federal pleading standards violate the “inviolate” right to a jury trial contained in most state constitutions. This Article describes states as generally falling into one of four categories as it relates to the scope of their jury trial rights: (1) those following English common law practice from when the United States became an independent nation, (2) those whose constitutions enshrine distinctively American attitudes toward juries prevalent during the eighteenth century, (3) those who codified the right to a jury trial at the same time they wrote the first civil procedure codes in the nineteenth century, and (4) hybrids. It demonstrates that in all four cases, federal pleading standards are unconstitutional because they allow judges to decide factual questions that must be left to a jury. In some cases, the requirement to provide heightened factual detail is a constitutionally impermissible procedural barrier between a litigant and a jury. Furthermore, this Article makes the original claim that states should reject federal pleading standards for different reasons than those typically invoked by critics of changes in federal pleading standards. Instead of treating state courts as satellites revolving around federal courts, this Article puts state courts at the center of the debate. It explains that states must consider different policy concerns than federal courts do when formulating pleading standards. First, states generally guarantee litigants the right to a remedy and that their courts will be open to all who wish to remediate an injury. Second, states claim to make it easier than it is in federal courts for litigants to get a jury trial and are supposed to and do hear the vast majority of cases in this country. Third, states elect judges, which necessitates juries serving as a check on politicized decisionmaking. Fourth, states should not consider pleading standards in a vacuum. They should consider their own pleading standards in light of how federal pleading standards threaten to close the courthouse door on many vulnerable litigants. If state courts use the same pleading standards as federal courts now do, those litigants will have nowhere to go and will be shut out of court entirely. These policy concerns do not just justify states using different pleading standards than federal courts do; they require states to do so.
州法院的联邦辩护标准
大多数州法院不能同时遵循州宪法和联邦辩护标准。即使他们可以,各州特有的政策考虑也迫使州法院拒绝联邦辩护标准。这是因为联邦法院已经改变了辩护标准,允许法官对驳回动议做出事实决定,并要求在申诉中提供更多事实细节。虽然学者们激烈地争论这些改变是否明智、公正,是否符合联邦法规和宪法的规定,但他们忽视了一个更重要的问题,即州法院是否能够和应该采用这些辩护标准。这种疏忽尤其令人担忧,因为许多州法院目前正在努力解决这些问题,而每年审理的案件数量是联邦法院的50倍。事实上,关于辩护标准的问题最值得学术界关注,但却得到了最少的关注。这篇文章用一个明确的“不”来回答这些问题。首先,联邦辩护标准违反了大多数州宪法中“不可侵犯”的陪审团审判权利。根据陪审团审判权的范围,本条将各州分为以下四类:(1)那些从美国成为独立国家开始就遵循英国普通法惯例的人;(2)那些宪法体现了18世纪盛行的美国人对陪审团的独特态度的人;(3)那些在19世纪编写第一部民事诉讼法的同时将陪审团审判的权利写入法律的人;以及(4)混合的人。它表明,在所有四个案件中,联邦辩护标准都是违宪的,因为它们允许法官决定必须留给陪审团的事实问题。在某些情况下,要求提供更多的事实细节是诉讼当事人和陪审团之间宪法上不允许的程序障碍。此外,该条提出了最初的主张,即各州应以不同于批评联邦辩护标准变化的人通常援引的理由拒绝联邦辩护标准。该条没有将州法院视为围绕联邦法院运转的卫星法院,而是将州法院置于辩论的中心。它解释说,各州在制定辩护标准时必须考虑与联邦法院不同的政策问题。首先,各州通常保证诉讼当事人获得补救的权利,并且他们的法院将向所有希望补救损害的人开放。其次,各州声称要使诉讼当事人获得陪审团审判比在联邦法院更容易,并且应该并且确实听取了这个国家绝大多数案件。第三,各州选举法官,这就需要陪审团作为对政治化决策的检查。第四,各州不应考虑在真空中提出标准。他们应该考虑自己的辩护标准,因为联邦辩护标准可能会对许多脆弱的诉讼当事人关上法院的大门。如果州法院使用与联邦法院相同的辩护标准,这些诉讼当事人将无处可去,将完全被法院拒之门外。这些政策问题不仅证明各州使用不同于联邦法院的辩护标准是合理的;他们要求各州这样做。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.80
自引率
3.70%
发文量
38
期刊介绍: The Michigan Law Review is a journal of legal scholarship. Eight issues are published annually. Seven of each volume"s eight issues ordinarily are composed of two major parts: Articles by legal scholars and practitioners, and Notes written by the student editors. One issue in each volume is devoted to book reviews. Occasionally, special issues are devoted to symposia or colloquia. First Impressions, the online companion to the Michigan Law Review, publishes op-ed length articles by academics, judges, and practitioners on current legal issues. This extension of the printed journal facilitates quick dissemination of the legal community’s initial impressions of important judicial decisions, legislative developments, and timely legal policy issues.
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