Life after Bilski

IF 4.9 1区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences
Mark A. Lemley, M. Risch, Ted Sichelman, R. P. Wagner
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引用次数: 24

Abstract

In Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court declined calls to categorically exclude business methods - or any technology - from the patent law. It also rejected as the sole test of subject matter eligibility the Federal Circuit’s deeply-flawed "machine or transformation" test, under which no process is patentable unless it is tied to a particular machine or transforms an article to another state or thing. Subsequent developments threaten to undo that holding, however. Relying on the Court’s description of the Federal Circuit test as a "useful and important clue', the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, patent litigants, and district courts have all continued to rely on the machine-or-transformation test in the wake of Bilski: no longer as the sole rule, but as a presumptive starting point that threatens to effectively become mandatory. In this Article, we suggest a new way to understand the exclusion of abstract ideas from patentable subject matter. No class of invention is inherently too abstract for patenting. Rather, the rule against patenting abstract ideas is an effort to prevent inventors from claiming their ideas too broadly. By requiring that patent claims be limited to a specific set of practical applications of an idea, the abstract ideas doctrine both makes the scope of the resulting patent clearer and leaves room for subsequent inventors to improve upon - and patent new applications of - the same basic principle. Recasting the abstract ideas doctrine as an overclaiming test eliminates the constraints of the artificial machine-or-transformation test, as well as the pointless effort to fit inventions into permissible or impermissible categories. It also helps understand some otherwise-inexplicable distinctions in the case law. Testing for overclaiming allows courts to focus on what really matters: whether the scope of the patentee's claims are commensurate with the invention’s practical, real-world contribution. This inquiry, we suggest, is the touchstone of the abstract ideas analysis, and the way out of the post-Bilski confusion.
比尔斯基之后的生活
在Bilski诉Kappos案中,最高法院拒绝了将商业方法——或任何技术——明确排除在专利法之外的要求。最高法院还拒绝了联邦巡回法院存在严重缺陷的“机器或转换”测试作为主题合格性的唯一测试,根据该测试,除非与特定机器相关联或将物品转换为另一状态或事物,否则任何方法都不能获得专利。然而,随后的事态发展有可能使这一持股落空。美国专利商标局、专利诉讼当事人和地方法院在Bilski案之后,依靠最高法院将联邦巡回法院测试描述为“有用和重要的线索”,继续依赖机器或转换测试:不再是唯一的规则,而是作为一个推定的起点,有可能有效地成为强制性的。在这篇文章中,我们提出了一种新的方式来理解抽象概念从可专利的主题排除。没有哪一类发明本身就过于抽象,不适合申请专利。相反,反对为抽象概念申请专利的规定是为了防止发明者过于宽泛地主张自己的想法。通过要求将专利权利要求限制在一个想法的一组特定的实际应用中,抽象概念原则既使最终专利的范围更清晰,又为后来的发明者留下了改进相同基本原则的空间,并为其申请新的专利应用。将抽象概念原则重新定义为一种过度要求的测试,消除了人工机器或转换测试的限制,以及将发明纳入允许或不允许类别的无意义努力。它还有助于理解判例法中一些难以解释的区别。对权利要求过高的测试允许法院关注真正重要的事情:专利权人权利要求的范围是否与发明的实际、现实贡献相称。我们认为,这种探究是抽象观念分析的试金石,也是走出后比尔斯基困惑的出路。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.80
自引率
2.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: Information not localized
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