Integration of pricing and inventory decision in a supply chain under vendor-managed inventory with defective items and inspection errors

IF 0.7 Q3 ENGINEERING, MULTIDISCIPLINARY

Engineering Review Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI:10.30765/er.1610

Esmat Taghipour, M. Seifbarghy, Mostafa Setak

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引用次数: 1

Abstract

In this paper, the production-inventory-marketing model for a two-stage manufacturer-retailer supply chain under VMI policy with a price-sensitive demand is studied. An imperfect production at the manufacturer and inspection process involving with Type I and II errors at the retailer are considered. We assume that the manufacturer gives products to the retailer in a number of equal-sized shipments. This model is formulated as a Stackelberg game in which the retailer retains a certain degree of autonomy by reserving the right to choose the retail price and the manufacturer determines replenishment frequency, replenishment quantity and wholesale price. The critical supply chain decision factors including the manufacturer’s wholesale price, the retailer’s price, shipment frequencies and number of shipments are determined maximizing the total profit of each member of the supply chain. A solution procedure is proposed to find the Stackelberg game equilibrium. The performance of the model is assessed by a numerical example. The numerical shows that it is more beneficial for both the manufacturer and the retailer when the demand is less price sensitive.

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供应商管理库存中存在缺陷品和检验错误的供应链定价与库存决策的集成

本文研究了具有价格敏感需求的VMI政策下两阶段制造商-零售商供应链的生产-库存-营销模型。考虑了制造商的不完美生产和零售商的第一类和第二类错误的检验过程。我们假设制造商将产品分成等量的几批交付给零售商。该模型被表述为一个Stackelberg博弈，其中零售商保留一定的自主权，保留选择零售价的权利，制造商决定补货频率、补货数量和批发价格。关键的供应链决策因素包括制造商的批发价格、零售商的价格、出货频率和出货数量，这些都是为了使供应链中每个成员的总利润最大化而确定的。提出了一种求解Stackelberg博弈均衡的方法。通过算例对模型的性能进行了评价。数值计算表明，当需求对价格的敏感性较低时，对制造商和零售商都更有利。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Engineering Review ENGINEERING, MULTIDISCIPLINARY-

CiteScore

1.00

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Engineering Review is an international journal designed to foster the exchange of ideas and transfer of knowledge between scientists and engineers involved in various engineering sciences that deal with investigations related to design, materials, technology, maintenance and manufacturing processes. It is not limited to the specific details of science and engineering but is instead devoted to a very wide range of subfields in the engineering sciences. It provides an appropriate resort for publishing the papers covering prior applications – based on the research topics comprising the entire engineering spectrum. Topics of particular interest thus include: mechanical engineering, naval architecture and marine engineering, fundamental engineering sciences, electrical engineering, computer sciences and civil engineering. Manuscripts addressing other issues may also be considered if they relate to engineering oriented subjects. The contributions, which may be analytical, numerical or experimental, should be of significance to the progress of mentioned topics. Papers that are merely illustrations of established principles or procedures generally will not be accepted. Occasionally, the magazine is ready to publish high-quality-selected papers from the conference after being renovated, expanded and written in accordance with the rules of the magazine. The high standard of excellence for any of published papers will be ensured by peer-review procedure. The journal takes into consideration only original scientific papers.