AGAINST THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INTENTIONS FOR THE FUTURE AND INTENTIONS FOR THE PRESENT

IF 0.8 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Chiara Brozzo
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

How should we account for the planning and performance of a bodily action in terms of the agent’s intentions? An influential answer invokes two distinct kinds of intention: intentions for the future (also known as prior intentions or distal intentions ), responsible for action planning, and intentions for the present (also known as intentions in action or proximal intentions ), responsible for action performance. I argue that there is something wrong with this influential answer: the notion of intention for the present is either superfluous (because intentions for the future can exercise functions associated both with action planning and with action performance) or ambiguous (because it conflates temporal, functional, and content-related aspects). Developing this criticism will lead to an alternative account of action planning and performance based on intentions of just one kind
反对对未来的意图和对现在的意图的区别
我们应该如何根据行为人的意图来解释身体行为的计划和表现呢?一个有影响力的答案涉及两种不同类型的意图:对未来的意图(也称为先前意图或远端意图),负责行动计划,以及对现在的意图(也称为行动意图或近端意图),负责行动执行。我认为这个有影响力的答案有一些问题:现在的意图这个概念要么是多余的(因为未来的意图可以行使与行动计划和行动表现相关的功能),要么是模糊的(因为它混淆了时间、功能和内容相关的方面)。发展这种批评将导致基于一种意图的行动计划和绩效的另一种解释
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
22
期刊介绍: Since its inauguration in 1964, the American Philosophical Quarterly (APQ) has established itself as one of the principal English vehicles for the publication of scholarly work in philosophy. The whole of each issue—printed in a large-page, double-column format—is given to substantial articles; from time to time there are also "state of the art" surveys of recent work on particular topics. The editorial policy is to publish work of high quality, regardless of the school of thought from which it derives.
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