The Problem of Manning the 6th Stalin's Siberian Volunteer Rifle Corps on the Example of the 75th Stalin's Separate Volunteer Rifle Brigade of Omsk-Siberians (1942)

Abstract

The article is devoted to the study of the problem of manning the formations of the 6th Stalinist Siberian Volunteer Rifle Corps formed in the summer of 1942. The study has been carried out on the basis of office materials of the Siberian regional party organizations of the CPSU (B) and the NKVD bodies involved in the formation of the corps. The study has been conducted on the basis of principles of consistency and historicism. It uses problem-chronological and comparative-historical methods to compare data from departmental and party documents, to trace the formation of volunteer formations in Siberian cities. The article proves that the historians’ assessments of timely formation of Siberian volunteer formations do not correspond to facts. The reason for this is that the existing scientific research on the history of the 6th Stalinist Siberian Volunteer Rifle Corps is based on party reports that paint a picture of successful recruitment of volunteers into the military formation. They quote figures, telling of thousands and tens of thousands who wrote applications for admission to the brigade, but they keep silent about difficulties that frustrated the timely recruitment of the required number of volunteers. The article analyzes difficulties in the corps formation due to lack of mobilization potential for recruitment of volunteers in Siberia at that time. Data is given on 5 failures in the formation of the corps. The principle of “voluntariness” in the formation of the corps was not respected; a significant number of citizens born in 1924 were conscripted. Particular attention is paid to the formation of the 75th Stalin’s Volunteer Separate Rifle Brigade of Omsk-Siberians. In its formation, the regional authorities faced great difficulties; only 29% of the brigade personnel was recruited in accordance with the principle of voluntariness. The author comes to the conclusion that despite conscription, the corps was voluntary. More than half of its personnel were volunteers. These people brought the “Siberian volunteer spirit” into their units, showed high stamina and mass heroism on the battlefields and subsequently earned the title of guards. The work is addressed to a wide range of researchers studying the history of the Great Patriotic War, problems of creating military units of the people's militia and volunteerism, history of the “Siberian divisions.”