The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the Sec

IF 3.4 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
J. Coffee, J. Coffee
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引用次数: 60

Abstract

Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act authorizes the SEC to prescribe "minimum standards of professional conduct" for attorneys "appearing or practicing" before it. This brief statutory provision frames a much larger question: What is the role of the corporate attorney in securities transactions in the public markets? Is the attorney's role that of (a) an advocate, (b) a transaction cost engineer, or, more broadly, (c) a gatekeeper - that is, a reputational intermediary with some responsibility to monitor the accuracy of corporate disclosures? The bar has long divided over this question, with the bar associations resisting any such obligation. Yet, Section 307 now "federalizes" this issue. Skeptics of a gatekeeper role for attorneys have long argued that (a) such a role conflicts with the traditional obligations of loyalty that the attorney owe their clients; and (b) imposing gatekeeping obligations on attorneys will chill attorney/client communications and thereby reduce law compliance. Thus, they have resisted a pending SEC proposal that would require an attorney to make a "noisy withdrawal" when the attorney is unable to stop or prevent certain ongoing material violations of law by the corporate client. This comment examines these arguments that attorneys make inferior gatekeepers and replies that (i) securities attorneys can and do perform a "gatekeeping" function; (ii) the differences between attorneys and auditors are less fundamental than bar associations maintain; (iii) in some respects, it is easier to impose gatekeeper obligations on attorneys than on auditors; and (iv) imposing such obligations on attorney should neither chill socially desirable client communications nor reduce the attorney's influence over the client (and probably will increase that leverage). Finally, this comments examines specific standards and obligations that the SEC might adopt to recognize the securities attorney's role as a gatekeeper. Going beyond the narrow "noisy withdrawal" issue, it proposes both limited certification and independence standards.
作为看门人的律师:Sec的议程
《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》第307条授权美国证券交易委员会为在其面前“出庭或执业”的律师规定“最低职业行为标准”。这一简短的法定条款提出了一个更大的问题:在公开市场的证券交易中,公司律师的角色是什么?律师的角色是(a)倡导者,(b)交易成本工程师,还是更广泛地说,(c)守门人——即负有监督公司披露准确性责任的声誉中介?长期以来,律师行业在这个问题上存在分歧,律师协会抵制任何此类义务。然而,第307条现在把这个问题“联邦化”了。长期以来,对律师扮演看门人角色持怀疑态度的人一直认为:(a)这种角色与律师对客户负有忠诚义务的传统义务相冲突;(b)对律师施加把关义务将阻碍律师与客户之间的沟通,从而降低法律遵从度。因此,他们抵制了美国证券交易委员会(SEC)的一项未决提案,该提案要求律师在无法阻止或防止企业客户正在进行的某些重大违法行为时,做出“嘈杂的退出”。这篇评论审查了律师是劣质看门人的论点,并回答说:(i)证券律师可以而且确实履行了“看门人”的职能;(ii)律师和审计师之间的差异并不像律师协会所认为的那样根本;(iii)在某些方面,律师比审计师更容易承担守门人的义务;(iv)对律师施加此类义务既不会影响社会期望的客户沟通,也不会降低律师对客户的影响力(可能会增加这种影响力)。最后,本评论审查了SEC可能采用的特定标准和义务,以承认证券律师作为看门人的角色。它超越了狭隘的“嘈杂退出”问题,提出了有限认证和独立标准。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.00
自引率
6.90%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Columbia Law Review is one of the world"s leading publications of legal scholarship. Founded in 1901, the Review is an independent nonprofit corporation that produces a law journal edited and published entirely by students at Columbia Law School. It is one of a handful of student-edited law journals in the nation that publish eight issues a year. The Review is the third most widely distributed and cited law review in the country. It receives about 2,000 submissions per year and selects approximately 20-25 manuscripts for publication annually, in addition to student Notes. In 2008, the Review expanded its audience with the launch of Sidebar, an online supplement to the Review.
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